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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The current thesis was designed primarily to examine the effect of propensity 
evidence  on  verdict  outcome  and  whether  the  gender  or  age  of  participants 
influenced the outcome. If propensity evidence did influence verdict, a consequential 
objective of the research reported in this thesis was to explore whether judicial 
instruction could limit or negate the impact of propensity evidence, and if there was 
an optimal time for the judicial instruction to be delivered. In addition, participants’ 
perceptions as to what they perceived as evidentiary gaps and their perceptions of the 
usefulness of propensity evidence in understanding the facts of the case were 
investigated. Results showed no significant differences in verdict outcome as a 
function of propensity evidence or as a function of participants’ gender; however, the 
age of the participant was significantly related to verdict outcome, with older adults 
more likely to deliver a verdict of not guilty. There were no significant associations 
in the confidence that participants reported in relation to their verdict. Propensity 
evidence did, however, interact with participants’ age in expressed desire to receive 
additional information regarding the defendant and other witnesses. A major 
limitation of the results of the current thesis was the ceiling effects that occurred, 
potentially obscuring any effects of propensity evidence and therefore the judge’s 
instruction. Explanations other than ceiling effects have been canvassed as to why no 
propensity effects were found. Recommendations have been made for future research 
to further examine the issue of admitting propensity evidence in the courtroom. 
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CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW 
 
 
Common law has laid the foundation for the Australian legal system and 
encompasses the fundamental principles of the rule of law and procedural fairness 
(Banks, 2007). The rule of law pertains to several notions including that every 
citizen, regardless of status, is bound by legislation and therefore accountable for 
their actions (Yenken, 2008). When an individual is charged with contravening 
legislation in a serious manner and enters a plea of not guilty, the individual is 
required to appear before a court of law and can be tried in front of a judge or jury. In 
instances where the jury has the task of determining the innocence or guilt of the 
individual, the role of the judge is to preside over the proceedings and maintain 
procedural fairness. Procedural fairness refers to the proceedings being conducted in 
a fair or just manner for all parties involved in the judicial process (Yenken, 2008). 
 
Central to the conduct of proceedings in a courtroom is the legislation 
regarding the rules of evidence, as these rules govern what material is permitted to be 
adduced by legal parties (Ligertwood & Edmond, 2010). Over time, some of the rules 
of evidence are changed and these changes may or may not have unintended 
consequences for the outcome of cases before the courts.  In 2010, the Evidence 
Act 2008 (Vic) came into effect and stipulated that tendency evidence, which is 
evidence about the defendant’s past conduct, reputation and offences, cannot be 
adduced by the prosecution unless the probative value of the evidence substantially 
outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on the accused. 
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 The rationale for previously excluding propensity evidence was that jurors 
might engage in what is known as propensity reasoning and conclude that, because 
the defendant had previously acted in a disreputable manner, it was likely that the 
defendant had committed the offence for which the defendant was currently on 
trial. Explanations for propensity reasoning and the way a decision-maker interprets 
propensity evidence have typically centred on attribution theory, with smaller 
consideration also given to the fundamental attribution error (McEwan, 2003; 
Smith, 2005; Tetlock, 1985). In addition to psychological theory and research, the 
concern underlying the admission of propensity evidence is borne out by the 
comments of some jurors that, had they known the defendant was previously found 
guilty of offences similar to the charge contained in the trial, they would not have 
returned a verdict of not guilty (Thomson, personal communication, 2011). 
 
 
 
If jurors are not able to discount or apply the evidence for its intended 
purpose,  and  therefore  base  the  ultimate  decision  on  irrelevant  or  prejudicial 
material, one consequence is that the defendant is unfairly disadvantaged (Diamond, 
Casper, & Ostergren, 1989). One approach the judiciary has taken to negate the 
improper use of propensity evidence in jury trials is to deliver an instruction aiming 
to limit the juror’s use of such evidence in their decision making. This approach is 
based on the expectation that jurors are capable of both understanding and applying 
the pertinent legal rules and the instructions by the judge which serve to govern their 
verdict (Diamond et al.). However, research findings have demonstrated inadmissible 
evidence can influence verdict even though jurors have been instructed to ignore this  
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evidence (Kassin & Sommers, 1997; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979; Steblay, Hosch, 
Culhane, & McWethy, 2006). 
 
 
 
Questions remain, however, as to how jurors interpret propensity evidence. 
For example, how does propensity evidence influence jurors’ decision making and 
can a curative instruction from the judge counter this influence? Our trial process 
relies upon both the appropriate delivery of instructions by judges to jury members 
and the ability of the juror to comprehend and follow these instructions throughout 
the   decision-making   process   (Thompson   &   Fuqua,   1998).   The   assumption 
underlying directive instructions to disregard certain evidence is that jurors are able 
to forget or ignore the inadmissible evidence which the jurors have heard during the 
trial proceedings. It is dubious, however, as to whether jurors can simply erase the 
material from memory when directed to do so by the judge (Kassin & Studebaker, 
1998). Further consideration needs to be given to what influence inadmissible 
evidence has on the jurors’ memory of the prior evidence, what influence the 
inadmissible evidence has on subsequent evidence when it is delivered with and 
without curative instructions, and the impression that is formed of the defendant by 
jurors who hear such evidence. 
 
 
 
Prior  to  exploring  the  literature  regarding  the  influence  of  propensity 
evidence and the utility of the limiting instruction, Chapter Two briefly examines 
demographic factors that have been shown to influence jurors’ verdicts. Research 
findings regarding jurors’ confidence in their verdict are also reviewed.  Chapter  
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Three discusses propensity evidence and the research available on prior conviction 
evidence. Chapter Four explores possible theoretical underpinnings, specifically 
attribution theory, for the manner in which a juror may use propensity evidence in 
their decision making. Chapter Five details the role of a judge’s limiting instruction 
in controlling how jury members apply propensity evidence and also examines the 
overall effectiveness of a judicial instruction. Chapter Six provides an outline of the 
current study and lists the main aims and hypotheses. Chapter Seven contains the 
study’s method and Chapter Eight presents the results of the research study. The 
thesis concludes with Chapter Nine which examines the study’s results in greater 
detail, considers the results in line with previous literature and recommends future 
areas for research endeavours. 
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CHAPTER 2. INFLUENTIAL FACTORS ON VERDICT OUTCOME 
 
 
 
Demographic characteristics of jurors and their relationship to verdict 
outcome have been researched extensively. While gender of jurors and mock jurors 
is one of the most commonly investigated demographic variables, age of jurors and 
mock jurors has been researched to a much lesser extent. 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Age 
 
 
 
 
A general critique noted of many empirical investigations is the frequent 
utilisation of university students to constitute a study’s sample. Hence, the sample is 
often composed of young adults. While some researchers have indicated that this 
may not limit the generalisability of findings, it is, nevertheless, a methodological 
limitation  that  has  been  noted  by  other  researchers  (Fischer,  1997;  Mills  & 
Bohannon, 1980; Pettus, 1990; Rose & Ogloff, 2001; Steblay et al., 2006). 
 
 
 
The relatively limited research examining the role that age may have on 
jurors’ verdicts is not restricted to research in law and psychology issues. The 
judgement and decision making of older adults in general has also been largely 
neglected (Peters, Hess, Vastfjall, & Auman, 2007). Similar to juror decision making, 
the emphasis has been on adolescents and young adults and their decision- making 
processes (Peters et al., 2007). 
12 
 
 
A study by Sealy and Cornish (1973) involved participants being placed into 
groups of twelve and listening to one of two tape-recorded trials (regarding either a 
theft or rape case) prior to discussing and reaching a verdict. The theft case had one 
defendant and the rape case had two defendants. Both the nature (uncorroborated 
versus corroborated) and strength (strong versus weak) of the evidence differed for 
the two defendants in the rape case. The individual verdict of the participant was 
examined against the independent variables of participants’ age, educational 
attainment, gender, occupational status, and previous experience or knowledge of the 
legal system. Of particular relevance to the current study is the age and gender of the 
participant. Three hundred and nineteen participants (141 females and 178 males) 
listened to the theft case while 257 participants (78 females and 179 males) listened 
to the rape case. In each case, there was a preponderance of 21 to 25 year-old 
participants. 
 
 
 
Although gender and verdict in the rape case were shown to be related, this 
effect was only apparent in relation to one of the defendants, with females 
significantly more likely to consider this particular defendant guilty in comparison to 
male participants. A significant finding across both cases was the relationship 
between the age and verdict of the participant. Specifically, individuals below the 
age of 30 years returned a not guilty verdict in both the theft and rape case 
significantly more so than any other age group. Thus, it appears that younger jurors 
are less likely to return a verdict supporting a conviction.  Sealy and Cornish (1973) 
concluded that “the younger the juror the readier to acquit he will be” (p.508). 
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Feild and Barnett (1978) also later demonstrated a leniency in younger adults. 
These researchers compared 80 undergraduate students with 80 randomly selected 
community members. Gender was equally divided in both the student and community 
sample. The average age of the student was 20 years and the average age of the 
community member was 46 years. The case detailed how a female victim was 
approached by a male while walking home. Although he asked for the time, the 
victim ignored him and he subsequently grabbed her around the neck, dragging her 
into an alley and threatening her with a knife while raping her. After the rape, the 
victim immediately called the police and reported the incident. Participants were 
asked to provide a sentence for the defendant rather than a judgement regarding his 
guilt or innocence as Feild and Barnett argued this outcome to be a more sensitive 
measure. Results indicated that the students were significantly more lenient in their 
sentences in comparison to the community members, with a mean recommended 
sentence length of 35.8 years and 49.6 years respectively. 
 
 
 
Mills and Bohannon (1980) also examined the influence of age on verdict 
outcome in relation to specific crimes. Their sample consisted of 197 individuals, 
117 females and 80 males, who had actually served on a jury and responded to a 
mail-out survey regarding the juror’s perception of both the trial experience and 
deliberation process. The mean age of participants was 43 years with an age range 
between 18 and 77 years. The independent variables that formed this study were age, 
education, gender, and race. Mills and Bohannon found that, in general, guilty 
verdicts increased with age. However, this relationship differed between female and 
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male participants. Although guilty verdicts were high across all age levels for 
females, there were two peaks for males; between 26 and 35 years of age and 
between 50 and 64 years of age, with males between the ages of 18 and 25 reporting 
the lowest percentage of guilty verdicts. Mills and Bohannon speculated that this was 
possibly due to the 18 to 25 year old males being the most likely to identify with the 
defendants, who were also young and of the same gender. 
 
 
 
In addition, although older participants were more likely to convict in rape 
cases, the pattern was reversed for murder cases, where older participants were less 
likely to render a guilty verdict. While verdict was best predicted by age in murder 
cases, gender was the best predictor of verdict in robbery cases. Mills and Bohannon 
(1980) surmised that the demographic variable with the most influence on jurors’ 
verdicts is related to the type and circumstances of each case. 
 
 
 
However, other research shows there to be no effect on verdict outcome as a 
function of the participant’s age. For example, Moran and Comfort (1982) 
investigated a broad range of demographic and personality predictors on juror 
behaviour. Fifteen hundred questionnaires were distributed to jurors who had served 
and reached a verdict on felony trials during the period of 1975 to 1976 in Dade 
County, Florida. The type of trial charge for each participant was not recorded by 
researchers. Three hundred and nineteen jurors responded, with females constituting 
47% of the total sample. Although specific information was not reported regarding 
age,  researchers  commented  that  their  sample  was  similar  in  age  to  Mills  and 
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Bohannon (1980) with the one exception being that it contained a higher percentage 
of jurors over the age of 60 years. Jurors provided demographic information and 
information in relation to verdict choice (both pre and post-deliberation), in addition 
to completing a number of opinion and personality measures. Age was found not to 
be related to verdict. 
 
 
 
In summary, given the mixed findings that have been previously reported, the 
relationship of age to verdict outcome is unclear. Although early research appeared 
to demonstrate an interaction between age, gender and type of crime, few studies 
investigated this relationship further. 
 
 
 
 
2.2       Gender 
 
 
 
 
Researchers have posited that due to the different approaches that females 
and males take in solving moral-reasoning dilemmas and their different 
conceptualisations of justice, it is likely that gender differences occur in the opinions 
and decisions formed in the context of a trial (Fowler, 2005). Although a common 
view is that females are considered more empathetic and lenient than males (Mills & 
Bohannon, 1980), research exists to demonstrate that in general, more guilty verdicts 
are provided by females (Fischer as cited in Fowler, 2005; Fischer, 1997; Mills & 
Bohannon, 1980) and females indicate a higher degree of certainty in a guilty verdict 
(McNamara, Vattano, & Viney as cited in Fowler, 2005). 
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Fischer (1997) manipulated the composition of mock juries to investigate 
whether  guilty  verdicts  increased  as  a  function  of  the  number  of  females 
participating in the mock jury deliberation process. A total of 426 female and 398 
male college students participated in the overall study. Mock juries consisted of 0, 2, 
4, 6, 8, 10 or 12 female college students where possible and a total of 76 mock juries 
were formed. Note that there were occasions when the male quota was not met and 
juries were conducted as close to the quota as possible (e.g. only eight out of the ten 
spots in a jury group allocated to males were filled). Approximately two-thirds of the 
participants were 18 or 19 years of age. Participants read a summarised trial of the 
alleged crime of rape prior to providing demographic information and answering a 
survey looking at trial variables. At the completion of the written materials, 
participants were asked to join other participants in a mock jury where the group was 
instructed to try and reach a unanimous verdict. 
 
 
 
A logistic regression analysis was conducted on five demographic variables 
and their second order interactions on guilty verdicts. Gender produced a significant 
effect, with 86% of females compared to 66% of males finding the defendant guilty 
prior to deliberation. The linear hypothesis suggesting an increase in guilty verdicts 
as a function of the number of females in a jury was rejected as the verdict reported 
by the mock juries differed significantly only when females represented the majority 
of jury members (at ten females to two males) or when the jury was all female. Even 
then, guilty verdicts were only recorded for 56% of these two groups. Furthermore, 
an examination of the intercorrelations among gender, a verdict of guilty, and trial 
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variables produced only small correlations between gender and trial variables in 
comparison to guilty verdict and trial variables, highlighting that gender would not 
contribute significantly to the prediction of verdict choice. 
 
 
 
However, there has been an overwhelming emphasis on gender-related crimes 
in studies that examine the relationship of gender to verdict (Ford, 1986; Fowler, 
2005; Schutte & Hosch, 1997; Villemur & Hyde, 1983). A high number of guilty 
verdicts by females in rape cases may be as a result of blame avoidance, a concept 
coined by Shaver (as cited in Workman & Freeburg, 1999). The concept of blame 
avoidance suggest that the more personally relevant the perceiver (e.g. juror) 
considers the situation to be, the less likely it is that the perceiver will allocate 
responsibility to an individual similar to themselves (Workman & Freeburg, 1999); 
hence, the defendant is considered guilty by females whereas males are less likely 
to find the defendant guilty. Given the research focus on rape or sexual assault cases, 
research findings may not be able to be generalised to other offence types. 
 
 
 
In addition, a study by Villemur and Hyde (1983) examined the effect of 
gender of the defence attorney, the age and attractiveness of the victim, and the 
juror’s gender on verdict. The sample consisted of 160 undergraduate students with 
an equal gender division. The study contained a 50-minute audiotape of a rape trial 
and pictures of the victim and defendant. Upon presentation of the case, participants 
were required to complete a questionnaire on items relating to the verdict, 
recommended  length  of  sentence,  and  attitudes  toward  the  crime  of  rape,  the 
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defendant and the victim. An open-ended question also requested the participant’s 
rationale for verdict outcome. Results revealed no significant differences on the 
verdict outcome reported by females and males; however, the pattern of verdict 
decisions was consistent with past literature as female participants delivered more 
guilty verdicts than male participants. 
 
 
 
Bridgeman and Marlowe (1979) interviewed actual jury members following 
the completion of the criminal trial in which they were involved. Their final sample 
consisted of a total of 65 jurors from 10 trials. As one trial contained two defendants, 
there were 11 defendants tried on charges such as assault, burglary, drug possession, 
murder, and rape. Thirty-six participants were female and 29 were male, all aged 
between 19 and 71 years. No more than seven participants were obtained from each 
trial. Researchers were interested in jurors’ perceptions regarding the trial process 
and   participants   responded   to   a   60-item   questionnaire.   Jurors’   verdict,   the 
importance attached to evidence, their perceived competence in legal parties and 
fellow jurors, and demographic information was provided by each participant. 
 
 
 
Participants   reported   an   overall   conviction   rate   of   82%   which   was 
comparable to the Santa Cruz County conviction rate, where the trials were held, of 
approximately 90% in felony trials. There were no significant relationships reported 
between verdict outcome and questionnaire data, nor were there any demographic 
variables that significantly related to verdict outcome. In addition, 90% of jurors 
agreed  that  they  were  “moderately”  or  “extremely  confident”  in  their  decision 
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making (Bridgeman & Marlowe, 1979). Moran and Comfort (1982) also found no 
significant differences in verdict outcome as a function of participants’ gender and a 
later study by Wissler and Saks (1985) also confirmed the finding that certain 
demographic variables, including gender, were not significantly influencing verdict 
outcome. 
 
However, mixed results have been identified in the literature. Pope and Meyer 
(1999) investigated the effect of gender on verdict outcome in a 100 minute 
videotaped armed robbery trial. One hundred and eighty-six undergraduate students 
(115 females and 71 males) were recruited for the study. Participants responded to 
questions relating to verdict and sentencing, confidence in verdict, and factors that 
influenced their verdict. Results indicated that males were significantly more likely 
to deliver a guilty verdict than were female participants and males were also more 
confident in their verdict. 
 
 
 
Gender differences have also been found in the prejudgement opinions of 
females and males. Costantini and King (1980-1981) conducted telephone interviews 
in which they surveyed participants in relation to one of three cases, all of which 
were of a non-fictitious nature. The first survey involved 323 participants who were 
to determine the verdict outcome for a charge of murder. The second survey was 
in relation to two cases, one of murder and one of attempted rape, and was considered 
by a sample of 369 participants. The questionnaire for the first survey contained 45 
items while a similar questionnaire was utilised in the second survey and consisted  
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of 57 items. Questionnaire items measured participants’ tendency to prejudge the 
defendant, participants’ recall of specific details of the cases, and participants’ 
demographic information. 
 
 
 
To ascertain prejudgement opinions, participants were asked whether they 
believed the defendant to be guilty of the alleged crime and whether the participant 
could act as an impartial juror in determining the case. This measure was obtained 
prior  to  reading  the  case  materials  and  was  based  on  the  participant’s  prior 
knowledge of the case via pre-trial publicity. Gender of the participant was 
significantly related to the juror’s prejudgement of the defendant’s guilt across all 
three of the cases, with females more likely than males to judge the defendant guilty 
prior to the trial commencing. This finding that females are more likely to prejudge 
the  defendant  as  guilty  in  comparison  to  males  was  replicated  by  Constantini, 
Mallery and Yapundich (1983) who utilised an additional case and sample of 383 
participants to determine the verdict in a murder trial. 
 
 
 
In summary, while gender differences have been identified in research studies, 
these have been found predominantly in relation to investigations utilising a case of 
rape or sexual assault. While females have also been shown to report higher 
conviction  rates  in  some  studies  involving  a  case  of  robbery  or  murder,  these 
findings are not found in other studies. Thus, currently no definitive conclusion can 
be drawn about the relation of gender and verdict. 
21 
 
 
2.3 Summary 
 
 
 
 
The above sections have reviewed what is known about the relationship 
between both jurors’ age and gender on verdict outcome. While gender has been 
frequently examined, there have been relatively few studies examining the impact of 
age on juror decision making. The findings suggest that the influence of demographic 
characteristics is not straightforward and requires further investigation. 
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CHAPTER 3. PROPENSITY EVIDENCE 
 
 
 
Rules of evidence exist to ensure that trial proceedings are conducted in an 
accurate and fair manner for all parties involved (Kassin & Sommers, 1997; Kassin 
& Studebaker, 1998). These rules were formulated by judges initially and latterly by 
statute. These rules are crucial in ensuring a fair trial as although numerous variables 
can influence a juror’s decision making, the evidence presented at trial is the most 
influential (Darbyshire, Maughan, & Stewart, 2002; Kassin & Neumann, 1997). 
 
 
 
One specific type of evidence, namely propensity evidence, has proved 
problematic for judges and law-makers. Propensity evidence is evidence about the 
disposition  or  tendencies  of  an  individual  and  propensity  evidence  about  the 
defendant has traditionally been excluded from criminal trials on the principle that 
the defendant should be tried on the facts relating to the present charge and not on 
evidence in relation to previous misconduct (Just, 2008; Ligertwood & Edmond, 
2010). However, propensity evidence was admissible in common law under limited 
circumstances. Evidence about past behaviour or previous offences of the defendant 
could be admitted if they were of a strikingly similar nature to the offence for which 
the defendant was on trial. Because of the similarity requirement, this type of 
propensity evidence became known at common law as similar fact evidence. 
 
 
 
In 1998 the State of Victoria enacted legislation to widen the circumstances 
under which propensity evidence might be permitted (Crimes Act, 1958).  
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However, Section 398A was repealed when the state of Victoria adopted the 
Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) on January 1st 2010. The Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) is 
largely uniform with the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) and 
the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) and is therefore also known as the Victorian UEA. 
Together, these previously mentioned Acts are referred to as the Uniform Evidence 
Acts.  
 
Sections 97 and 101 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) state: 
 
The tendency rule 
 
97 (1) Evidence of the character, reputation or conduct of a person, or a tendency 
that a person has or had, is not admissible to prove that a person has or had a 
tendency (whether because of the person's character or otherwise) to act in a 
particular way, or to have a particular state of mind unless- 
(a)  the party seeking to adduce the evidence gave reasonable notice in 
writing to each other party of the party's intention to adduce the 
evidence; and 
(b)  the court thinks that the evidence will, either by itself or having 
regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking 
to adduce the evidence, have significant probative value. 
 
 
97 (2) Subsection (1)(a) does not apply if - 
 
(a) the evidence is adduced in accordance with any directions made by the  
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(b) court under section 100; or 
(b)  the  evidence  is  adduced  to  explain  or contradict  tendency  evidence 
adduced by another party. 
Note: The tendency rule is subject to specific exceptions concerning character of and 
expert opinion about an accused (sections 110 and 111). Other provisions of this Act, 
or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions. 
 
Further restrictions on tendency evidence and coincidence evidence adduced by 
prosecution  
101 (1) This section only applies in a criminal proceeding and so applies in addition to 
sections 97 and 98. 
101 (2) Tendency evidence about an accused, or coincidence evidence about an 
accused, that is adduced by the prosecution cannot be used against the accused unless 
the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it 
may have on the accused. 
101 (3) This section does not apply to tendency evidence that the prosecution adduces 
to explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by the accused. 
101 (4) This section does not apply to coincidence evidence that the prosecution 
adduces to explain or contradict coincidence evidence adduced by the accused. 
 
   Note that while section 97 addresses tendency evidence in civil proceedings 
and evidence which is adduced by an accused in criminal proceedings, section 101  
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specifies evidentiary burdens which pertain to prosecution evidence. The following 
section provides a background to propensity evidence and subsequent sections 
address propensity evidence in the context of psychological and legal implications. 
 
3.1 A closer look at tendency (or propensity) evidence 
 
 
 
 
Similar fact evidence, known under the uniform Evidence Acts as tendency 
evidence, is evidence where conduct displayed by a party, typically the defendant, 
is of conduct or a state of mind similar to that alleged by the prosecution in relation 
to the current charge (Ligertwood & Edmond, 2010). This evidence is typically 
evidence that the defendant has committed an offence other than the one charged.  
It  can also include evidence of criminal history, that is, that he or she has acted 
criminally or inappropriately even though a formal charge or conviction may not 
have resulted from the behaviour (Hunter, Boniface, & Thomson, 2010). 
 
 
 
Historically, the admission of tendency evidence was evaluated in regard to 
two competing principles; the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant from the 
admission of propensity evidence about the defendant and the probative value that 
was added to the case by presenting the propensity  evidence  (Arenson,  1999;  Just,  
2008; Ligertwood & Edmond, 2010).  The probative value of the evidence is 
assessed by that evidence increasing the probability of certain facts in issue which  
provide proof of those facts and support a guilty verdict (Hamer, 2002). The 
prejudicial effect arising from reliance upon propensity evidence relates to the danger  
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that a juror may attribute greater weight to the propensity evidence than is merited by 
the evidence (Hamer, 2002; Ligertwood & Edmond, 2010). To determine whether 
the prejudice is unfair, the judiciary considers if the evidence has the potential to 
unduly influence the court whilst bearing insufficient probative worth. In the event 
that propensity evidence has little probative weight or relevance but has substantial 
prejudicial value, the propensity evidence must be excluded under common law 
(Arenson, 1999; Just, 2008; Ligertwood & Edmond, 2010). The balance between the 
effects of probative and prejudicial value is at the basis of determining whether 
propensity evidence is admissible in court. 
 
3.2 The probative value of tendency evidence 
 
 
 
 
Tendency (or propensity evidence) have probative value in instances where 
the evidence contextualises the current charge by revealing to the jury the type of 
relationship or context in which the alleged offence occurred. This is used as an 
approach in rebutting the argument of the incident as an isolated event. For example, 
in R v. Loguancio (2000) evidence of the prior relationship between the deceased 
and the defendant was adduced for the purpose of rebutting the defence of 
consensual sex and instead establishing the offences in light of a non-consenting 
sexual relationship. Thus, the jury was provided with necessary background 
information in order to accurately assess the situation in which the current charge  
arose; however, this context was not to be used to imply a propensity in the defendant. 
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   In GBF v. The Queen (2010), it was reported that evidence was adduced by the 
Crown to establish the similarity of the defendant’s inappropriate behaviour toward 
female employees and illustrate a pattern of behaviour and tendency to act in a 
particular way at their place of employment. This tendency was used to highlight that 
if the defendant acted in the alleged manner on one occasion, he was likely to have 
offended in the same way on separate occasions. Various notices of intention to 
adduce tendency evidence were submitted and assessed against the common 
benchmark that the more general the tendency is stated, the less likely that the 
evidence has probative value (Townsend v. Townsend, 2001). 
 
  R v. McDonald (2011) contained evidence used to illustrate the context or 
nature of the relationship between the accused and his partner (presumed abducted and 
murdered). The evidence consisted of various assaults on the deceased and incidents 
of stalking, harassment, and verbal insults over a period of almost 24 months. The 
Crown argued that such evidence pertained to several issues in dispute in the case, 
including whether a crime had actually been committed (or whether Ms McDonald 
had absconded from her husband), the identity of the killer, the alleged abduction of 
Ms McDonald being for a malevolent purpose, and the accused’s motive and intent.  
 
3.3       The prejudicial dangers of tendency evidence 
 
 
 
 
In contrast, one of the inherent risks of presenting tendency evidence is the 
belief that jurors may apply the material inappropriately to the prejudice of the  
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defendant. While there are occasions when jurors can rightfully use this evidence to 
determine the innocence or guilt of the defendant, there are also instances where the 
juror is not permitted to use the evidence in such a manner. In the event that the 
evidence is misused, a  decision  on  the  ultimate  issue  may  be  based  on  the  
defendant’s  past behaviour or propensity to act in a certain manner and not on the 
facts that are presented in the current case (Forde, 2008; Hamer, 2002). One 
prominent approach to  decision  making  that  the  juror engages  in  is  known  as  
propensity  reasoning (Arenson,  1999;  Just,  2008).  Jurors are thought to reason 
that the defendant’s previous behaviour is indicative of someone who is ‘that kind of 
person’ (R v. PZG, 2007) in each and every occasion the defendant is confronted 
with (Hamer; Waight & Williams, 1985; Walton, 2006). 
 
Furthermore, time and again an application for an appeal is made on the 
grounds that the jury was inadequately instructed by the judge and consequently 
utilised the evidence in an impermissible manner (R v. Best, 1998; R v. PZG, 2007). 
If a juror is considering the ultimate issue on the basis of an inappropriate application 
of facts, this may hinder the course of justice by perverting the assumptions that 
underpin our legal system. Such assumptions include those of fair justice, the right to 
an unbiased trial, and the presumption of innocent until proven guilty (Arenson, 
1999; Ligertwood & Edmond, 2010; Waight & Williams, 1985). 
 
Alternatively, appeals are also sought on the grounds that the propensity 
evidence should have been deemed inadmissible at the outset by the trial judge due  
to the excessively prejudicial nature of the propensity evidence (R v. Pearce, 1999).  
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Faith in the legal system may falter if inconsistent judgments are made regarding the 
admissibility of propensity evidence or if jurors are perceived to be unduly exposed 
to propensity evidence of weak probative value and this influence from the evidence 
is unable to be corrected by the trial judge (Marder, 2005). Therefore, the role of 
the judge is critical; first in determining whether the propensity evidence is 
permitted in the courtroom, and then directing the jury on the appropriate use of  
the evidence (Just, 2008; R v. PZG, 2007). Such a direction from the judge can 
instruct jurors in one of three ways: the first being to limit the use of propensity 
evidence by the jury; the second being to provide no direction or limitation to the 
jury; and the third being to direct the jury to disregard the evidence (Hunter, personal 
communication, 2012).   
 
The difficulty also lies in the recognition that prosecution evidence can be of 
high probative strength while also being of a prejudicial nature toward the 
defendant. Therefore, the implication for  the  defendant  is  that  regardless  of  
whether  the  evidence  adduced  is  of  a prejudicial nature, the judge will 
nevertheless permit the evidence to enter the trial proceedings  if  its  probative  value  
is  worthwhile.  Researchers have commented that information regarding the 
appropriate evaluation of propensity evidence and how to instruct on its use would 
be an invaluable aid to legal professionals (Walton, 2006). 
 
 
One of the more recent empirical contributions to the field is by Hunter et 
al. (2010) who conducted a pilot study utilising 39 jurors from ten criminal trials 
across Sydney’s District and Supreme Courts between 2004 and 2006. Twenty-five  
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jurors who participated in the study were female and 14 were male. Forty percent of 
female jurors were older than 55 years of age and over half of the male jurors were 
aged between 35 and 54 years. Twenty-seven of the participants had been jurors in 
trials involving sexual assault charges, ten participants were involved in one of two 
trials relating to a murder charge and two participants had been involved in a trial 
regarding drug charges. 
 
The sole requirement for the inclusion of a trial into the pilot study’s sample 
was that either the defence or the prosecution adduced evidence of a defendant’s 
prior criminal record or history of criminal behaviour. In particular, four trials were 
closely examined in relation to the use of a judge’s limiting instruction and whether 
the instruction was effective in restricting the juror’s use of propensity evidence. The 
focus on these four trials in particular was due to the quality of responses that jurors 
provided in the questionnaire. Two trials involved a single count of murder and two 
trials involved 10 and 14 counts of assault and sexual assault. In the first two trials, 
the evidence involved background information on the relationship between the 
defendant and the victim and details of uncharged criminal acts engaged in by the 
defendant prior to the alleged offence being tried before the court. The other two 
trials also involved information relating to uncharged acts and one of the trials also 
contained evidence of the relationship between the alleged victim and defendant. In  
all four trials, the judge informed the jury that the evidence could only be used as a 
means of contextualising the events prior to the offence and not to reason a tendency  
 
 
 
31 
 
 
for the defendant to act violently and infer that this propensity is an explanation for 
the current charges against him (Hunter et al., 2010). 
 
 
 
Questionnaires were administered post-verdict and ascertained jurors’ 
attitudes  and  views  in  relation  to  criminal  history,  their  experience  of  the  trial 
process, evidence presented in the trial and the most important factor in reaching 
their verdict, judicial direction and instruction from the judge, and assessment of the 
judge, defence and prosecution as well as fellow jury members throughout trial 
proceedings. Demographic information was also obtained. 
 
 
 
A review of the responses from jurors revealed concerning comments. In 
considering acts of a discreditable nature, jurors were more likely to engage in 
propensity reasoning and infer in a prejudicial manner. Jury members also 
overvalued prior discreditable conduct allegedly engaged in by the defendant. For 
example, in the response to the query regarding what factors influenced the verdict 
that they delivered, one juror reported it was based on the defendant’s previous plea 
of guilty to two counts of assault (Hunter et al., 2010). 
 
 
 
Furthermore, jurors expressed a high level of confidence in predicting the 
defendant’s commission of future crime when the defendant had no prior record but 
did possess a violent, dishonest or immoral past. Such a past may prejudice jurors to  
a greater extent than a defendant’s prior criminal record, as the defendant with a 
negative past is considered resourceful in not being apprehended. A limitation of the  
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pilot study, conducted at the University of New South Wales, was that it was 
mainly observational and only qualitative data was reported from survey responses. 
 
 
 
Pettus (1990) conducted face-to-face, tape recorded interviews with 17 jury 
members when the trial in which they were participating had concluded. Of the 17 
participants, five were involved in a trial covering the alleged sexual abuse and 
sodomy of a child, eight in a case of second degree murder, and four in a case of 
aggravated  robbery.  Pettus  posed  questions  to  the  participants  that  covered  the 
factors influencing their verdict outcome, the time at which the verdict was arrived 
at, their experience of the deliberation process, and their personal decision-making 
process. Pettus noted that the adage “innocent until proven guilty” may be a fallacy 
as jurors began forming negative impressions of the defendant prior to the judge’s 
opening address.  Importantly, in describing the factors involved in their general 
decision making, jury members indicated the influence of a defendant’s prior 
conviction when weighing up the evidence and determining a verdict. However, this 
was a general observation made by Pettus (1990) and the jury members and 
trials from which these comments originated from were not specified. 
 
 
 
Greene and Dodge (1995) investigated the influence of disclosing the 
defendant’s past criminal record on the verdict rendered by participants. Their sample 
of 105 individuals had been called upon to serve as jurors and ranged in age  
from 19 to 71 years. Participants were required to read a summarised bank robbery 
trial transcript which was mailed to them and contained approximately 1,500 words.  
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Participants then responded to questions regarding verdict outcome and their 
confidence in the verdict, the defendant’s criminal propensity, and the credibility of 
specific witnesses. The independent variables consisted of the type of evidence that 
was presented in the transcript (no prior record, prior acquittals, or prior convictions) 
and  the  presence  or  absence  of  judicial  instruction  regarding  the  use  of  such 
evidence. Participants were also asked the extent to which the prior acquittal or prior 
conviction evidence influenced their verdict outcome. Each research condition 
contained between 16 and 19 participants. Participants convicted the defendant more 
when they were informed of his prior convictions than when they were aware of a 
prior acquittal or that the defendant had no previous record. Note that the deliberation 
process of jurors was not investigated in this study. 
 
 
 
Earlier studies also show similar findings. Doob and Kirshenbaum (1972) 
explored the effect of a prior criminal record detailing five convictions for breaking 
and entering private homes and a further two convictions for possession of stolen 
property. Forty-eight participants ranging in age from 18 to 50 years were provided 
with a hypothetical case study approximately 400 words in length. The study’s 
design consisted of four conditions; a control group in which the scenario was read 
with no prior record and three experimental groups. The first group contained no 
prior record and information that the defence considered there to be no purpose in 
the defendant testifying; the second group consisted of the defendant taking the stand  
and providing no important evidence, although his prior convictions were established 
while he was on the witness stand; and a third group received the evidence regarding  
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the defendant’s prior convictions and an instruction from the judge clarifying that 
this information was only relevant in determining the defendant’s credibility as a 
witness. Upon reading the case, participants were required to indicate how likely it 
was that the defendant was guilty. Irrespective of the experimental condition, 
participants who received information regarding the defendant’s prior criminal record 
were more likely to find the defendant guilty than participants in the control group. 
Note that the deliberation process was absent once more from empirical 
examination. 
 
 
 
Wissler and Saks (1985) investigated the influence of charge similarity on 
juror verdict outcome in a sample of 160 participants. No demographic information 
about the participants was provided by researchers. Participants read a written, two- 
page hypothetical case involving a charge of either auto-theft or murder. The charge 
of auto-theft constituted the dissimilar prior conviction evidence in the murder case 
and  vice  versa  for  the  murder  case,  which  contained  the  auto-theft  charge  as 
evidence of a prior criminal record. The other research conditions consisted of either 
prior convictions of the same nature to the current charge (i.e. auto-theft or murder), 
a charge of perjury, and a no-information control group. Therefore, the independent 
variables were type of charge and type of prior conviction evidence presented to the 
participant. An instruction from the judge was provided after participants were made 
aware of the defendant’s prior criminal record, regardless of the type of evidence that  
constituted the previous conviction. As in previously reviewed studies, participants  
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were instructed to use such evidence only to determine the credibility of the 
defendant’s testimony and not as an indication of guilt. 
 
 
 
After reading the hypothetical case, participants responded to a series of 
questions relating to verdict outcome, certainty in verdict, witness credibility, the 
rationale for their verdict, and to what extent the knowledge of the prior criminal 
record had in influencing their verdict. Results showed that a greater number of 
guilty verdicts were obtained when the prior conviction was for an offence similar to 
the defendant’s current charge and the lowest conviction rate recorded was in the 
group who did not receive evidence relating to a prior criminal record. 
 
 
 
Research by Hans & Doob (1976) demonstrated the prejudicial effect of prior 
criminal record on juries, as opposed to individual jurors. They investigated 
individual and group decision making in a sample of 160 participants reading a 
hypothetical burglary case. Of note, 40 of the 160 participants were undergraduate 
students; however, no further demographic information (e.g. age or gender) was 
reported by researchers. The independent variables were whether or not the 
hypothetical  case  involved  evidence  that  the  defendant  had  been  previously 
convicted of a single count of burglary and individual versus group verdict. When 
evidence of the defendant’s past conviction was provided, this was followed by an 
instruction from the judge regarding the use of such evidence. 
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While prior conviction evidence did not influence the number of guilty 
verdicts returned by individual participants, there was a difference in the number of 
group guilty verdicts. Juries who had received evidence of the prior conviction when 
compared to juries who did not receive such evidence were more likely to convict 
the defendant. Hans and Doob (1976) surmised that it may be easier for an individual 
to obey a judicial instruction and disregard or ignore certain pieces of evidence when 
determining a verdict, whereas the evidence may be discussed and strengthened in 
the minds of the jurors during the group deliberation process, thereby potentially 
affecting verdict outcome. 
 
 
 
A more recent study investigating the effects of a defendant’s prior criminal 
record on juror decision making was conducted by Lloyd-Bostock (2000). 
Participants in her study viewed a condensed, reconstructed half-hour videotaped 
trial of a defendant either charged with handling stolen goods, indecently assaulting a 
woman, or deliberately stabbing another individual. There were eight variations in 
the previous conviction evidence tendered  in the trial: no mention of previous 
conviction or good character; mention that the defendant had no prior convictions 
and was therefore of good character; previous convictions of a similar and recent 
offence; previous conviction of a similar yet old offence; previous conviction of a 
dissimilar and recent offence; previous conviction of a dissimilar and old offence; 
previous and recent conviction of indecent assault on a child; and previous and old 
conviction of an indecent assault on a child. 
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 Participants were required to watch the videotape and complete a questionnaire 
asking for their initial verdict and the extent to which the defendant was likely to 
have committed the offence. Participants then engaged in deliberation in groups of 
twelve and subsequently completed a second questionnaire, again indicating their 
verdict and the likelihood that the defendant had committed the offence. Participants 
also had to respond to questions regarding their impressions of the defendant. 
 
It was found that opinions of the defendant’s likely guilt were lower in the 
condition in which the participants received evidence of a dissimilar conviction and 
that these ratings were lower than those reported from participants in the baseline 
conditions (that is, where either no mention was made of previous conviction or 
good character or mention was made in regards to the defendant possessing no prior 
convictions and was therefore of good character). Lloyd-Bostock (2000) proposed 
that when no information is provided about the character of a person, participants 
rely on general stereotypes about the type of individual that is on trial in a court of 
law. In relation to verdict, a recent similar conviction generated the highest number 
of guilty verdicts. Thus, a previous criminal conviction appears highly prejudicial to 
the defendant and the juror’s consideration of culpability. 
 
 
 
Finally, being informed of a defendant’s past criminal convictions can 
influence the impression formed of the defendant. Neuberg and Fiske (1987) 
proposed that the process of impression formation occurs via one of three 
mechanisms. First, the task of understanding individuals and their behaviour may be  
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simplified and merely attributed on the basis of their categorisation to a relevant 
stereotype or group. Alternatively, a person may be considered in relation to their 
characteristics or traits; which is a more personal or attribute-oriented approach. 
Lastly, the person forming the impression may decide that the original category is 
unsuitable and alter the categorisation as a result of further information regarding the 
individual’s traits or attributes, with their behaviour now interpreted in line with the 
new category. 
 
When an impression has been formed, interpretations of behaviour or 
evidence presented in a courtroom are then made in support of the initial impression 
(Snyder, Decker-Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977). Therefore, a negative impression that is 
formed  in  relation  to  the  defendant  may  result  in  the  contamination  of  future 
evidence, as the juror discounts or rejects information that is inconsistent with their 
initial impression. Moreover, as negative information is weighted more heavily than 
information with a positive quality; trial evidence that paints the defendant in an 
unfavourable light will be more salient to a juror (Tanford & Penrod, 1984). Hence, 
it appears that exposure to propensity evidence has the potential to create a bias in 
the juror and may therefore result in jurors overlooking evidence that is contrary to 
the negative impression they have already formed. Furthermore, jurors in the study 
by Hunter et al. (2010) said that they had observed fellow jury members form 
prejudicial impressions of the defendant early in the trial proceedings. Thus, the 
earlier this bias is created, the more this is to the detriment of the defendant. 
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   However, a study by Thompson, Fong, and Rosenhan (1981) showed that 
knowledge of the defendant’s previous conviction did not result in a significantly 
higher number of guilty verdicts. In their study, 288 participants viewed videotapes 
of a felony murder trial before rendering a verdict individually and after group 
deliberation. The evidence adduced in the trial (either evidence supporting a 
conviction that was of an inadmissible nature, evidence supporting an acquittal that 
was of an inadmissible nature, or no inadmissible evidence) and the content of 
judicial instruction (highlighting the importance of either protecting the defendant’s 
right to a fair trial versus delivering an accurate verdict) were the independent 
variables of the study. Participants who received the evidence supporting an acquittal 
were less likely to convict the defendant than the other two groups; however, the 
latter two groups did not vary significantly in their conviction rates. Interestingly, the 
experimental group receiving evidence regarding a defendant’s prior criminal record 
were less likely to convict than the control group who received no such evidence. 
Researchers hypothesised that this occurred as a result of participants who received 
pro-conviction inadmissible evidence overcorrecting for the influence of such 
evidence on verdict outcome. 
 
 
 
In summary, while a small number of studies exist to refute the prejudicial 
nature seemingly inherent in disclosing prior conviction evidence to a jury, overall it 
appears that, when considering the literature regarding the effects that disclosure of a 
defendant’s prior criminal record produces on verdict outcome, such evidence can 
have a damaging effect on the outcome of the verdict for the defendant on trial. 
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CHAPTER 4. ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND THE IMPACT ON JURY 
DECISION-MAKING 
 
The general dangers inherent in the improper use of propensity evidence have 
been noted in the previous chapter. An insight into the development of these dangers 
and the consequences of such reasoning would be an important contribution to 
understanding how to target these inferences effectively through judicial instruction 
(Walton, 2006). In general, the social psychology perspective of attribution theory is 
posited as providing insight into how cause, responsibility, and blame are assigned to 
different phenomena (Calhoun & Townsley as cited in Workman & Freeburg, 1999). 
Specific to the legal arena, jurors’ unfair biases influencing their verdicts have been 
explained by reference to attribution theory (McGillis, 1978). Given the relevance of 
attribution theory to the field of psychology and the law, this theory is reviewed in 
the below section. 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Attribution theory 
 
 
 
 
Broadly speaking, attribution theory encompasses a range of theories relating 
to the explanations people use to understand the causes of behaviour, often in the 
form of imputing an individual’s character traits or circumstances (Buss, 1978; 
McArthur, 1972). There is a degree of overlap among the various attribution theories 
discussed in the literature today and collectively they provide comprehensive 
explanations regarding human judgmental processes (McGillis, 1978). For the  
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purposes of the current research study, attribution theory loosely refers to the 
explanation an individual develops upon assessing the behaviour of others and 
subsequently inferring the causes of such behaviour (McGillis, 1978). In general, 
there are two  broad  domains;  one  which  posits  behaviour  to  be  a  result  of  
external  or situational aspects and one which  posits the behaviour to arise from 
the internal or dispositional nature of the individual (McEwan, 2003; Smith, 2005). 
 
 
 
It has been well observed that individuals often create an immediate first 
impression of a person and draw inferences on aspects of that particular person, such 
as personality and general demeanour (Tetlock, 1985). Indeed, personality traits are 
readily identified and observed in an individual. Moreover, these traits are viewed as 
being an accurate representation of the person’s general disposition and aid in 
providing an explanation for behaviour (Tetlock, 1985). In other words, behaviour is 
viewed as being the result of that individual being a certain ‘type’ of person without 
taking into account any contextual factors. An assumption is made that behaviour 
observed from a single situation is representative of that individual’s behaviour 
across all contexts. Therefore, individuals are inclined to infer from one example of 
behaviour that this is representative of the person’s behavioural repertoire (Smith, 
2005). 
 
 
 
 
Attribution theory also contends that there is an element of consistency in the 
behaviour of a person. Therefore, tendering evidence which demonstrates a pattern 
of behaviour, such as Livermore’s (1978) example of a defendant with a long history 
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of sexual assaults, is appropriate when considering this notion of consistency. The 
fear of juror’s wrongly engaging in propensity reasoning and utilising previous 
conduct of the defendant to prove their guilt in the current case, however, has 
constrained the submission of such evidence (Livermore. 1978). 
 
 
 
McGillis (1978) argues that the theories relevant to the legal system are those 
by Heider (1958), Jones and Davis (as cited in McGillis, 1978), and Kelley (1973). 
Heider conceptualised behaviour as the product of intrapersonal and environmental 
factors and considered the responsibility attributed to these factors to vary along five 
levels. As the levels and attribution to the environment concurrently increase, 
intrapersonal attribution decreases. These levels were later titled by Shaw and Sulzer 
(1964) as association, causality, foreseeability, intentionality and justifiability. 
 
 
 
The perspective of Jones and Davis (as cited in McGillis, 1978) specifically 
concentrates on how an individual perceives the intentions and dispositions of others 
via behavioural observation. Their theory, labelled “correspondent inference theory” 
is composed of six steps which outline an individual’s process from the time of 
observing an individual’s behaviour to attributing personality traits of that individual 
(Jones & Davis as cited in McGillis, 1978). 
 
 
 
Lastly, Kelley’s (1973) view relates to the judgements that an individual 
makes from information on three elements of the person: a history of similar 
behaviour  toward  the  same  entity  (consistency);  a  history  of  behaviour  toward 
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differing entities (distinctiveness); and similar behaviour exhibited by other 
individuals toward the same entities (consensus) (Boyll, 1991; Lussier, Perlman, & 
Breen, 1977; McGillis, 1978). 
 
 
 
Kelley’s (1973) theory integrates with the two approaches of Heider (1958) 
and Jones and Davis (as cited in McGillis, 1978) in describing behaviour as being 
due to external or situational aspects or as a result of the internal or dispositional 
nature of the individual (McEwan, 2003; Smith, 2005). In particular, behaviour is 
thought to reflect the internal or dispositional nature of the individual (person 
attribution)  when  the  individual  engages  in  the  behaviour  across  a  number  of 
different  situations  and  others  do  not  engage  in  this  behaviour.  Conversely, 
behaviour is more likely to be attributed externally or to the environment (stimulus 
attribution) when the individual acts in this manner solely in relation to specific 
stimuli and other people also engage in the same conduct only in the presence of the 
specified stimuli (Kelley. 1973; Lussier et al., 1977; McGillis, 1978). Kelley also 
considered that behaviour could result from chance and labelled this as circumstance 
attribution. 
 
 
 
The consistency variable is pertinent to discussions regarding the effect of a 
defendant’s prior criminal record (McGillis, 1978). In a study by Lussier et al. 
(1977), researchers provided 79 psychiatric nursing students (61 female and 18 male; 
mean  age  of  20.4  years)  with  a  hypothetical  case  detailing  a  drug  offence. 
Researchers varied the drug offender’s socio-economic status (low versus high), 
offence history (no previous convictions versus an extensive record) and trial format 
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(by judge or jury). Participants were asked to rate the extent that they considered the 
person, environment, and circumstance to contribute to the defendant’s behaviour, 
and to recommend the length of sentence to be imposed. Results showed that drug 
offenders with an extensive criminal record were viewed with higher levels of 
attribution regarding personal causation and therefore received sentences of a longer 
duration than first-time offenders. Conversely, participants’ attributions relating to 
environment and circumstance were significantly related to recommendations of a 
shorter sentence. 
 
 
 
In addition, as propensity evidence often encompasses prior criminal history, 
such evidence is likely to display the defendant in an unfavourable manner. When 
individuals are ‘liked’ or well-known to a person, positive behavioural outcomes are 
more likely to be attributed to dispositional influences and negative outcomes to 
environmental causes. Taylor and Koivumaki (1976) have termed this occurrence the 
‘positivity effect’ and suggest that, conversely, people who are viewed negatively 
will be held accountable for bad behaviour on a dispositional level and considered 
not  responsible  for  positive  behaviour  (Taylor  &  Koivumaki, 1976).  This 
‘negativity effect’ (Taylor & Koivumaki, 1976) may transpire from the admission of 
propensity evidence in a courtroom, where jurors regard the defendant responsible for 
negative behaviour (i.e. the alleged crime) and consequently deliver a guilty verdict. 
 
 
 
The harmful effects associated with the overall attributional process are that 
individuals tend to engage in overly confident predictions regarding people and their 
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behaviour when provided with minimal information on the individual’s trait 
characteristics.  These confident predictions are due to the ill-founded belief 
regarding cross situational behavioural consistency, which refers to the notion that 
the behaviour an individual displays in one situation is indicative of their behaviour 
across a wide variety of situations (Ross & Nisbett, 1991). Hence, not only may 
jurors be unaware of when their confidence is misplaced, they may also be over- 
emphasising the wrong information in their decision making. This also has 
implications on the juror’s consideration regarding beyond reasonable doubt (Smith, 
2005)  as  it  may  unduly  sway  the  juror’s  rationale  and  decrease  their  level  of 
 
uncertainty. 
 
 
 
 
Generally speaking in relation to juror confidence, research by Greene and 
Dodge (1995) revealed that confidence varied significantly as a function of the type 
of verdict returned by the juror. Specifically, jurors who considered the defendant 
guilty were more confident in their verdict than jurors who delivered a not guilty 
verdict. A series of studies conducted by Kassin and Neumann (1997) also replicated 
the finding that participants who voted guilty were significantly more confident in 
their verdict choice than participants who returned a verdict of not guilty. Fischer 
also determined that an individual’s certainty in their verdict was a predictor of 
verdict outcome (as cited in Fischer, 1997) and demonstrated in a later study that not 
guilty verdicts were significantly related to uncertainty about one’s verdict (Fischer, 
1997). 
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4.2       Summary 
 
 
 
 
The aim of the preceding chapter was to underline the relevance of attribution 
theory to the admission of propensity evidence into the courtroom. While propensity 
evidence can act to demonstrate consistency in the defendant’s behaviour, research 
has shown that there are also harmful consequences when underestimating the role of 
the situation and overestimating the role of the individual’s disposition in regard to 
explaining behaviour. For example, once an individual has attributed the cause of 
behaviour to the disposition or personality of the individual, they are unlikely to 
easily modify their perspective. Therefore, any behaviour that follows from this 
conceptualisation will be considered in a manner that fits consistently with this initial 
framework (Ross & Nisbett, 1991). This is irrespective of new information that 
becomes available which disputes the initial judgment that was formed (Lord, Ross, 
& Lepper, 1979), such as any evidence that follows the propensity evidence in the 
trial proceedings. Given the risk to the defendant’s right to a fair trial, measures need 
to be implemented to diminish the chance of any bias occurring. The following 
chapter addresses how instructions from a judge aim to mitigate improper influences 
of propensity evidence on a juror’s decision-making process and final verdict. 
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CHAPTER 5. JUDICIAL INSTRUCTION 
 
 
 
 
One of the most fundamental roles of the judge is to apply the rules of 
evidence that relate to material adduced throughout the trial proceedings (Kassin & 
Sommers, 1997; Tanford, 1990; Thompson & Fuqua, 1998). Therefore, a judge has 
the authority to instruct jury members on the manner in which they can use certain 
pieces of evidence. Thompson and Fuqua (p.445) cite this as “perhaps the most 
interesting evidentiary rule”. There are a number of common instructions that can be 
provided by the judge to the juror. Research in the field has typically focused on the 
admonition to disregard. This instruction is required when evidence of an 
inadmissible nature is revealed to the court and the judge directs the jury to ignore 
the particular piece of information previously presented to them (Thompson & 
Fuqua, 1998). 
 
 
 
However, as stipulated in Sections 97 and 101 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), 
tendency (propensity) evidence is admissible in instances where it is of “significant 
probative value”, despite its potential prejudice against the defendant. As aspects of 
this particular act are also common in the Australian Capital Territory, New South 
Wales, and Tasmania, this section that is the focal point of the legal context 
discussed in this thesis essentially represents an Australian-wide position on the 
law. In recognising the bias inherent in the nature of propensity evidence, judges are 
required to caution jurors on the appropriate manner in which to use the 
information and inform the juror of the constraints surrounding the application of  
 
 
48 
 
 
such evidence. The cautioning of jurors is achieved through providing what is  
known as a limiting instruction, whose purpose is to curtail both inappropriate 
attributions and use of propensity evidence by jurors (Hunter et al., 2010; Marder, 
2005; Tanford, 1990).  
 
In providing this instruction, however, there is the assumption that jurors 
ignore or compartmentalise the specified material. The questions that often arise 
from a judicial instruction concern whether the instruction is successful in detailing 
to the juror what is expected of them and the extent to which the juror can use 
evidence for one specific purpose and then isolate its influence when deciding other 
aspects of the matter before them (Kassin & Studebaker, 1998). Aside from whether 
jurors can comprehend such an instruction is the question of whether jurors are 
willing to and capable of following the directions of the judge. These questions are 
the focus of this chapter. 
 
 
 
In general, research exists to support the view that instructions from a judge 
are unsuccessful in achieving their intended purpose. Studies investigating the legal 
system have criticised the timing of the instruction and its content (Elwork, Sales, & 
Alfini, 1977; Marder, 2005; Severance, Greene, & Loftus, 1984; Tanford, 1990). The 
following sections review the literature available in relation to the effectiveness of 
judicial instructions, prior to providing an overview of the explanations posited to 
account for jurors’ inability to implement an instruction from the judge. 
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   Research findings about instructions to disregard and limiting instructions are 
discussed in the following section. As researchers have commented that the effects 
from studies investigating limiting instructions are similar to those examining an 
admonition to disregard, the parallel appears appropriate (Tanford, 1990). In addition, 
a common example that appears in the literature relating to both types of 
instructions concerns a defendant’s prior criminal record (Diamond et al., 1989; 
Severance et al., 1984). 
 
5.1 The ineffectiveness of judicial instruction 
 
Currently, as has been the tradition for many years, instructions are generally 
delivered orally in the end of trial summation by the judge after all evidence and 
closing arguments have been presented (Charrow & Charrow, 1979; Goldberg, 1980; 
Marder, 2005; Young, 2003). However, the delivery of the judge’s instructions during  
the  summation  stage  is  not  without  criticism.  This is owing to jurors disclosing 
that they find the judge’s final summation tedious and do not pay full attention 
during the address (Young, 2003). For this reason, it has being argued that the 
limiting instruction is a futile exercise and a case of ‘too little, too late’ (Goldberg, 
1980). 
 
 
 
In addition, Section 5.3 describes how the juror actively constructs a version 
of events that fit the evidence presented throughout the trial and arrives at a finished 
product prior to or at the conclusion of the trial (Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983;  
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Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Researchers involved in a New Zealand study have 
observed that this active and interpretative evaluation is an accurate representation of 
the method a juror utilises during the trial process (Young, Cameron, & Tinsley as 
cited in Young, 2003). Thus, in Section 5.3 research is described which suggest that 
jurors actively construct a story-like tale of the evidence presented during a trial. 
Evidence  is  therefore  commonly  evaluated  on  the  basis  of  preceding  material. 
 
   Providing judicial instruction to prohibit the use of certain evidence at the 
conclusion of the trial may have little impact, as evidence has already been 
assimilated into the story in line with prior evidence disclosed in the courtroom. 
Furthermore, jurors themselves have attested to observing fellow jury members form 
biased opinions relatively early in the trial (Hunter et al., 2010) and this effect has 
also being established in research endeavours (Bridgeman & Marlowe, 1979; 
Hastie, et al., 1983; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979; Pennington & Hastie, 1981). 
 
For example, Kassin and Wrightsman (1979) conducted a study with 107 
introductory psychology students (60 females and 47 males) who were required to 
view a one-hour videotaped auto-theft trial. The timing of the judge’s instruction on 
the  requirements  of  proof  was  manipulated  by  the  researchers  and  was  either 
provided prior to the presentation of evidence, after the presentation of evidence, or 
not provided at all. Participants did not enter deliberation and responded in writing to 
questions relating to verdict outcome, confidence in verdict, and the strength of the 
evidence. Results indicated that participants who were instructed before the evidence  
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was presented were less likely to render a guilty verdict in comparison to participants 
in the other two research conditions. 
 
Half of the sample (N= 54) was also required to record their opinion on 
verdict outcome and confidence during specified points in the trial. It was found that 
participants who were instructed before the admission of evidence were less likely to 
consider the defendant guilty at points recorded throughout the course of the trial. 
Importantly, early decision making appeared predictive of verdict outcome, with 
opinions at the first decision point in the trial (after the examination-in-chief and 
cross-examination of the first witness) found to significantly relate to the 
participant’s final verdict. Therefore, not only is remaining evidence likely to be 
perceived in a biased manner but an instruction from the judge at the conclusion of 
the trial is likely to be ineffective as opinions have already been formed during the 
trial process. 
 
 
 
Research by Greene and Dodge (1995) has also revealed that an instruction 
from the judge regarding the use of the defendant’s prior criminal record was 
ineffective in controlling the use of such evidence. This finding regarding the futility 
of judicial instruction to control the juror’s use of a defendant’s past conviction is 
substantiated by Doob and Kirshenbaum (1972), Hans and Doob (1976), and Wissler 
and Saks (1985) (refer to Section 3.4 for a review of these studies). Notably, 
participants in Wissler and Saks’ study openly verified that the evidence of the 
defendant’s prior conviction increased their view that he was guilty of the current  
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charge  and  was  therefore  central  in  their  decision  making  on  verdict  outcome. 
Wissler and Saks commented that the repetition, or consistency, of the defendant’s 
behaviour also appeared to increase the juror’s confidence that the defendant was 
guilty of the current charge. The earlier theory of attribution is relevant to this 
finding that consistency of behaviour is influential toward a juror’s confidence in 
decision making. 
 
In a study by Pickel (1995), 236 psychology students listened to an audiotape 
of a fictional trial in which the defendant was being tried on a charge of theft. The 
independent variable of evidence (prior criminal record relating to a perjury 
conviction) was ruled either admissible or inadmissible. In the inadmissible 
condition, the judge either provided a legal basis as to the determination or did not 
provide any explanation after the ruling. Additionally, there was a control group who 
received no evidence about the defendant’s prior criminal record. A second 
independent variable, the credibility of the witness (high and low) was also varied in 
the experiment. At the conclusion of the audiotape, participants were required to 
complete a questionnaire covering verdict outcome, the extent to which the 
defendant’s prior criminal record influenced verdict outcome, and the credibility of 
each witness. The results demonstrated that the percentage of guilty verdicts varied 
significantly across the research conditions, with the participants in the control group 
reporting the lowest percentage and the participants in the admissible group reporting 
the highest percentage. 
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Nietzel, McCarthy, and Kern (1999) undertook a meta-analysis of research 
findings pertaining to limiting instructions. On the basis of this analysis, Nietzel et al. 
concluded that instructions to disregard or limit the evidence adduced in a trial are 
ineffective in eliminating or restricting its influence on verdict outcome. Steblay et 
al. (2006) also conducted a meta- analysis of the research findings assessing 175 
hypotheses about limiting instructions drawn from 48 studies involving a total of 
8,474 participants. Their objective was to examine the effect of three interrelated 
variables on juror decision making; that of potentially inadmissible evidence, 
judicial instruction to disregard such evidence, and the timing of the judicial 
instruction. The results of the meta-analysis confirmed the earlier findings of Nietzel 
et al. that judicial instructions are largely ineffective. 
 
 
 
A suggested approach in counteracting the potential effects of propensity 
evidence involves the judge providing an immediate instruction once propensity 
evidence is adduced (Bjork, 1998; Marder, 2005). The rationale behind this approach 
is that by interjecting prior to or at the very beginning of the integration process, 
there is minimal opportunity for the juror to use the propensity evidence in an 
unintended manner. Hence, the likelihood that the admission of propensity evidence 
will wrongly influence jurors’ conceptualisation of events and erroneously shape 
jurors’ perceptions throughout the remainder of the trial, as described by the 
integrated representation (Hastie et al., 1983) or story formation (Pennington & 
Hastie, 1992) perspective in Section 5.3, may be decreased when the appropriate use  
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and purpose of propensity evidence is immediately made known to jurors. However, 
the meta-analysis by Steblay et al. (2006) also revealed that when the evidence was 
coupled with an immediate instruction from the judge, this particular combination 
generated higher convictions rates from the participants. 
 
From a memory perspective, Bjork (1998) posits that although a judicial 
instruction aims to inform the juror of what is required in order to restrict the use of 
certain pieces of evidence, the juror is concurrently being re-exposed to this 
information or piece of evidence. As a result, the information may be reinstated. 
Hans and Doob (1976) also alluded to the idea that discussion of the defendant’s 
prior criminal record in the group deliberation process may strengthen the evidence 
and Tanford (1990) concluded that the judge may be emphasising the material by 
highlighting the need to constrain the manner in which the evidence is used. This 
effect may be even more pronounced when an explanation for the delivery of an 
instruction is provided, as evidence is elaborated on. Hence, a judicial instruction 
immediately following the evidence may in fact be detrimental to the defendant’s 
case. 
 
 
 
In Pickel’s (1995) previously mentioned study, participants who received the 
instruction to disregard without any further explanation from the judge reported a 
percentage of guilty verdicts that varied by one-point in comparison to the control 
group. However, participants who were provided with an explanation as to why the 
evidence was inadmissible recorded a guilty verdict at a rate of 12% more than the  
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conviction rate recorded by participants who did not receive an explanation. Thus, 
participants who were provided with a rationale regarding the inadmissible nature of 
the evidence were more likely to convict the defendant in comparison to participants 
who did not receive any justification. 
 
The adverse influence of a limiting instruction has also been demonstrated in 
civil cases (Tanford & Cox as cited in Greene & Dodge, 1995; Wolf & Montgomery 
as cited in Greene & Dodge). This counterproductive effect was demonstrated more 
than half a century ago when Broeder (1959) reviewed the findings of a jury project 
conducted by the University of Chicago. An unspecified number of participants 
(with no demographic information reported in reference to them) listened to an 
audiotape of a mock civil trial consisting of an automobile accident. The defendant’s 
liability and the status of his liability insurance were manipulated. It was either very 
clear or doubtful as to the defendant’s liability. Participants were either informed that 
the defendant had no insurance, informed that the defendant had insurance and this 
disclosure was met with no further comment by legal personnel, or informed that the 
defendant had insurance, however, the defence objected to this information being 
disclosed and the judge subsequently instructed jurors to disregard. Participants 
engaged in group deliberation at the conclusion of the audiotape. 
 
 
 
The majority of the participants found in favour of the plaintiff and the 
average awards were $33,000, $37,000 and $46,000 for the no insurance, insurance 
details provided, and insurance details provided with instructions to disregard  
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conditions respectively. Thus, a higher award amount was recommended by 
participants who had heard the information regarding the defendant’s insurance status 
and an instruction to disregard it, perhaps indicating that addressing a matter in court 
will heighten the material and therefore the likelihood that it will be retained by 
jurors. However, no statistical analyses were reported by Broeder (1959) and this is 
merely an observation of the data. Of note, the admonition to disregard was effective 
in curtailing discussion in relation to the defendant’s insurance status during the 
group deliberation process. Just as a judge must weigh up the prejudicial nature 
versus probative value of the propensity evidence, the defence must exercise caution 
in objecting to evidence, as this action may draw unwarranted attention to the 
material. 
 
5.2       The effectiveness of judicial instruction 
 
 
 
 
Adding to the complexity is empirical evidence that suggests an instruction 
from the judge to disregard a particular piece of evidence can prevent biases being 
formed in the mind of the juror. Furthering the work of Nietzel et al. (1999), Steblay 
and colleagues reported varied effectiveness for an instruction by the judge when 
delivered in the end of trial summation. They found that when comparing a control 
group, who received evidence and no judge’s instruction to disregard such evidence, 
with an experimental group who received evidence and an end of trial instruction, the 
control group reported a significantly higher conviction rate than the experimental 
group. Thus, Steblay et al. (2006) showed that an instruction provided at the  
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conclusion of trial proceedings can act to mitigate any prejudicial effects that 
inadmissible evidence may have on verdict outcome. As this is in contrast to other 
research in the field (Hastie, et al., 1983; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979; Pennington & 
Hastie, 1981), further investigations are required into the varied findings in relation 
to the temporal positioning of judicial instruction. 
 
Furthermore, a study by Borgida and Park (1988) showed that a limiting 
instruction enabled participants to consider the defendant’s prior criminal record 
only in the context of his truthfulness. The study investigated the effects of providing 
147  participants  with  a  judicial  instruction  regarding  either  one  of  the  two 
approaches to America’s entrapment defense. The first, a subjective approach, relates 
to the predisposition of the defendant and involves the prosecution proving that the 
defendant was willing to engage in the criminal act even before an inducement was 
offered. The second, an objective approach, relates to the type of inducement 
presented to the defendant and ensures improper methods were not utilised by law 
enforcement. 
 
 
 
Of relevance to the current thesis is that the admission of the defendant’s 
prior conviction was also varied by researchers. Sixty-four female and 83 male 
undergraduate psychology students viewed a videotaped trial of a defendant charged 
with cocaine possession and distribution. In the trial, participants in one of the 
research conditions were informed of the defendant’s earlier conviction for the  
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distribution of a different substance and participants in another research condition 
remained uninformed of the conviction. Participants then deliberated in groups of 
five to seven and returned a verdict prior to completing a questionnaire. 
 
 
 
Responses were recorded in relation to the juror’s verdict outcome, 
confidence in verdict, and understanding of the judge’s charge, entrapment 
instructions and general trial testimony. It was found that participants who were 
informed of the defendant’s prior criminal record were significantly more likely to 
convict the defendant in comparison to participants who were unaware of the 
defendant’s prior conviction. However, this result was only produced by participants 
who received (subjective) judicial instruction that permitted the use of the previous 
conviction to establish the defendant’s criminal predisposition and therefore 
demonstrated that he had not been entrapped or duped into committing a criminal 
act. 
 
 
 
Lastly, Greene and Dodge (1995) concluded that although a limiting 
instruction was to no avail in controlling the use of prior conviction evidence, the 
instruction did influence the standard of reasonable doubt that jurors required in 
order to convict the defendant. In addition, Steblay and colleagues (2006) 
acknowledged that while an admonition to disregard may not inhibit the influence of 
inadmissible evidence, the rationale that the judge offers regarding the inadmissible 
nature of the evidence may increase juror compliance. For example, providing little 
to no justification or stating that the evidence is inadmissible on the grounds that it  
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was  illegally  obtained  proved  less  successful  than  explanations  relating  to  the 
hearsay,  irrelevant,  or  unreliable  nature  of  the  evidence.  This is in contrast to 
previous research by Borgida and Park (1988), Pickel (1995), and Tanford and Cox 
(1988). However, the value of the judge’s instruction may lie in his or her reasoning 
as to why such evidence is unacceptable in the courtroom. Therefore, the factors that 
facilitate adherence to a judge’s limiting instruction require further investigation. 
 
5.3       Why jurors may not comply with judicial instruction 
 
 
 
 
While the juror’s comprehension of the instruction is regarded as one 
explanation for the ineffectiveness of judicial instruction, several psychological 
theories  have  also  been  proposed  to  explain  the  difficulties  that  a  juror  may 
encounter when attempting to follow an instruction from the judge. In general, 
cognitive and motivational factors have been implicated in the ability of the juror to 
obey a judge’s instruction (Daftary-Kapur, Dumas, & Penrod, 2010; Steblay et al., 
2006). The theory of juror justice describes a motivational component of the juror 
that may preclude obeying the judge’s instruction, while the theory of integrated 
representation addresses the cognitive processes of the juror which may prevent 
jurors from following the judge’s limiting instruction. The following paragraphs 
outline each of these rationales in more detail. 
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Jury Comprehension 
 
 
For jurors to be able to follow an instruction that is given by a judge they 
must first be able to understand what is being asked of them. Thompson and Fuqua 
(1998) cite this difficulty in relation to understanding limiting instructions and argue 
that  this  problem  exists  because  verdicts  can  be  appealed  on  the  grounds  of 
inadequate instructions by the judge, yet are rarely appealed on the basis of jurors 
failing to understand the instructions provided to them  (Marder,  2005; Tanford, 
1990; Thompson & Fuqua, 1998). Therefore, judges ensure their instructions are 
legally sound at the possible expense of being easy to comprehend by jurors 
(Severance et al., 1984). Hence, it first needs to be determined whether jurors can 
understand the instruction before consideration is made as to the extent that they can 
follow its direction. 
 
Research studies from over thirty years ago indicate that the use of a pattern 
instruction was no more effective than not providing one at all. However, when 
mock jurors in an experimental group received a rewritten form of the instruction 
there was an improvement shown in comprehension (Elwork et al., 1977). Elwork et 
al. redrafted Michigan negligence instructions in light of empirical knowledge 
regarding memory, perception, and comprehension of language. Twenty-nine 
undergraduate students viewed a videotape of a judge providing legal instructions to 
a jury. There were two versions of the instructions; one was a set used in an actual 
automobile  injury  case  and  the  second  was  a  set  of  instructions  revised  by 
researchers. After watching the videotape, questionnaires that covered areas relating  
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to the role of the jury, courtroom procedures, and laws specific to the trial charge 
were supplied to participants. Comprehension scores were compared between the 
two research conditions and results showed that the rewritten instructions enabled 
participants to more easily comprehend and recall the instructions. Note, however, 
that the participants’ ability to apply the legal instruction did not vary significantly 
among groups. 
 
Elwork et al. (1977) conducted a further study to assess their variables of 
interest in a more heterogeneous sample, while additionally examining the effect of 
instructions delivered at different periods of the trial. The researchers utilised 84 
female and 70 male participants with a mean age of 34.5 years. The videotaped trial 
again involved an automobile accident. A control group viewed a videotape that 
contained no judicial instruction while one experimental group received standard 
instructions and a second experimental group received rewritten instructions. The 
instructions were either provided at the outset of the trial, at the conclusion of the 
trial, or on both occasions. Participants responded to a questionnaire relating to 
verdict outcome, role of the jury, courtroom procedures, and the facts and laws 
specific to the trial charge. Participants were also provided with a chance to change 
their verdict. No significant effect was found in relation to the time that the judicial 
instruction was presented to participants and their comprehension and recall of the 
instruction’s content.  Comprehension was again poor in the standard instruction 
group while the rewritten instructions proved once more to negate any uncertainty or 
confusion in the participants who received this form of instruction. 
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Although research by Elwork and colleagues (1977) examined the use of a 
pattern instruction in a civil matter, these results have been replicated by other 
researchers in criminal cases involving a limiting instruction. For example, Severance 
and Loftus (1982) conducted a series of studies; two of which are of relevance to this 
discussion. Two hundred and sixteen students viewed a videotaped burglary trial and 
were provided with pattern instructions that excluded specific legal definitions, 
pattern instructions that defined reasonable doubt and intent in addition to clarifying 
the manner in which participants could use evidence of the defendant’s prior 
conviction, or no pattern instruction. Half of the participants responded to a 
questionnaire without engaging in the process of group deliberation and the other 
half of participants deliberated in groups of six prior to completing the questionnaire. 
Responses were provided in relation to verdict outcome, confidence in verdict, 
comprehension of the instructions, ability to apply the instructions to the trial, and 
the participant’s recall of details presented in the trial process. 
 
 
 
There were no significant effects reported for verdict outcome across the 
three research conditions. Furthermore, the three conditions did not significantly 
vary in their comprehension of the limiting instruction. Participants who received 
pattern instructions that defined reasonable doubt and intent, in addition to clarifying 
the manner in which participants could use evidence of the defendant’s prior 
conviction, reported a similar percentage of errors in comparison to the group who 
did not receive any instructions. 
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In a follow-up study, Severance and Loftus (1982) tested revisions made by 
researchers to the previously supplied instructions that were in accordance with legal 
and psychological perspectives. Two hundred and sixteen psychology students were 
recruited for the study which involved the independent variables of instruction (no 
instructions, pattern instructions, or revised instructions) and opportunity to deliberate 
(deliberation or no deliberation). The videotaped trial remained identical to the 
previous study and the questionnaire was also retained, albeit with minor 
amendments. 
 
 
 
Error rates for participants’ comprehension of the limiting instruction varied 
significantly across the research conditions with the lowest errors recorded by the 
group receiving the revised instructions. Thus, rewording judicial instructions with 
the aid of empirical work in the legal and psychological arena enabled participants to 
more easily understand the content of these instructions. Albeit American literature, 
this highlights the need for comparative and recent Australian data regarding both 
the juror’s comprehension of judicial instruction and whether revised judicial 
instruction is necessary. 
 
In addition, Hunter et al. (2010) found that jury members were unclear over 
several fundamental functions of the trial process that impact upon their decision 
making. For example, jurors appeared to misconstrue the fact that the inability of the 
prosecution to present a case to its required standard of proof should therefore result  
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in an acquittal. The opinions formed by the juror in relation to these matters may also 
influence their overall decision making. 
 
In recognising the shortcomings of the present day instructions, 
recommendations have been outlined in order to aid the judge and juror to perform 
their relevant roles. There is much support from researchers who believe that the task 
of the juror would benefit from providing mechanical aids (Darbyshire et al., 2002; 
Wood, 2007; Marder, 2005; Tanford, 1990). These recommendations also relate to 
the fact that different people learn via different methods and the trial process should 
be seen to accommodate these various methods rather than relying solely on the oral 
approach (Wood, 2007; Marder, 2005). One suggestion is to provide the transcript 
of the court proceedings or a copy of the judge’s summation (Marder, 2005; Tanford, 
1990) and jurors in the past have made such a request (Young et al. as cited in 
Young, 2003). To the author’s knowledge, although court transcripts are provided 
to jurors in Victoria (Thomson, personal communication, 2008) researchers have not 
investigated what the effect of providing the transcript has on jurors’ ability to follow 
judge’s instructions. This approach appears novel in the empirical arena. 
 
Juror Justice 
 
While comprehension of the instruction’s content is one factor purported to 
influence compliance with judicial instruction, other explanations have also been  
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advanced to account for the difficulties that jurors may encounter when attempting to 
obey an instruction from the judge. The juror justice theory refers to the juror’s 
belief that justice is encapsulated in achieving an accurate outcome regarding the 
guilt or innocence of the defendant. This is achieved through assessing all of the 
relevant evidence available, even if it is not admitted through an appropriate medium 
in the courtroom (Bjork, 1998; Kassin & Studebaker, 1998). However, this view 
contrasts with that of the overall legal system which deems that justice is achieved 
when due process is followed throughout court proceedings (Kassin & Sommers, 
1997). 
 
 
 
 
Due process is achieved when the trial is conducted in line with the rules of 
evidence and procedures stipulated in legislation (Kassin & Studebaker, 1998). The 
admission of propensity evidence into the courtroom, and the subsequent limiting 
instruction delivered by the judge, highlights the incongruence between these two 
values. Whilst the court’s idea of justice is preserved through providing the limiting 
instruction, it may be at the expense of the juror’s notion of justice as the instruction 
requires the juror to restrict the use of a specific piece of evidence which may be of 
probative value. Hence, some jurors may be reluctant and unmotivated to follow 
such an instruction as it impedes upon their notion of justice (Bkork, 1998; Kassin & 
Studebaker, 1998; Steblay et al., 2006). Therefore, a suggested factor in determining 
whether jurors will comply with the admonition from a judge is in relation to the 
judge’s reasoning surrounding the instruction. 
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Support for the notion of juror justice is in a study by Kassin and Sommers 
(1997).  They compared the reported verdicts of four groups of undergraduate 
students who had read a prepared summary of a murder trial. The 81 participants 
were divided into groups that consisted of a baseline control group and three 
experimental groups. Evidence in the experimental conditions involved a wiretap and 
was either declared admissible, inadmissible on the grounds that the information was 
obtained illegally (due-process) or inadmissible as a result of the evidence being 
inaudible and thus unreliable (low credibility) immediately after the evidence was 
presented by the prosecution. Results showed that a guilty verdict was delivered 
more often by participants in the admissible and inadmissible (due-process) groups 
in comparison to the inadmissible (low credibility) groups, thus indicating that jury 
members are willing to sacrifice due process and disobey the instructions of a judge 
by employing any source of evidence they view as relevant in achieving what they 
believe is a just verdict. 
 
 
 
An associated finding from the Kassin and Sommer’s (1997) study was that 
jury members were more likely to follow the instruction to disregard from the judge 
when material was withdrawn on the grounds of lacking credibility. In this particular 
study, the evidence was considered to possess low credibility as a result of the judge 
declaring the audio recording to be of poor quality. Therefore, how credible the 
propensity evidence is perceived to be by the juror may be one determining factor 
that  is  related  to  the  willingness  of  the  juror  to  follow  judge’s  instruction.  
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Specifically,  it  is  thought  that  the  extent  to  which  the  evidence  is  discredited 
enhances the juror’s willingness to obey instructions from the judge (Bjork, 1998). 
 
Integrated representation 
 
 
 
 
A second explanation of why judge’s instructions may not be adhered to, 
albeit perhaps unintended, and the difficulties that jurors may encounter when 
attempting to follow a limiting instruction is as a result of a process known as 
integrated representation (Hastie et al., 1983) or story formation (Pennington & 
Hastie, 1992). 
 
 
 
The hypothesis underlying the integrated representation explanation is that 
jurors construct a story of the events surrounding the charge being contested in the 
trial by progressively assimilating the material presented before them, with each 
piece of new information evaluated in a manner that is consistent with the juror’s 
evolving portrayal of events (Goldberg, 1980; Hamilton, 2004; Young et al. as cited 
in Young, 2003). This evaluation occurs through methods such as inference and 
credibility appraisals (Hastie et al., 1983; Pennington & Hastie, 1992). In essence, a 
plausible story is made to fit the evidence and more often than not, only one story is 
constructed. 
 
Additionally, the juror must also comprehend the instructions that the judge 
is providing in relation to the charge, verdict alternatives, and the components that  
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define each alternative before being required to deliver a decision regarding the 
defendant’s culpability on the basis of their overall representation. Determining a 
decision requires the juror to match their story with the verdict alternatives to deliver 
a verdict outcome. If no match is made, the defendant is considered not guilty 
(Pennington & Hastie, 1990). It is thought that the clearer the evidence is to the 
juror, the earlier they will begin to formulate a verdict. If the evidence is ambiguous 
or complex, then it appears decision making is delayed until the deliberation phase of 
the trial (Pettus, 1990). 
 
 
 
A shortcoming of this process is that, as discussed in earlier chapters, 
subsequent information can be shaped or manipulated by the initial impression that is 
formed. In attempting to identify the influences on the early stages of an individual’s 
integrated representation or story formation process, Pennington and Hastie (1990) 
posit that a major consideration is the juror’s perception of how the social world 
functions. Hence, the relevance of attribution theory is established once more as it 
details how individuals, and therefore jurors, perceive the general functioning of 
society and the behaviours that are exhibited by individuals. Whether the juror’s 
belief is that behaviour is due to external or situational aspects or pertaining to the 
internal or dispositional nature of the individual (or an entirely different idea) is of 
most relevance in a setting where a defendant may be judged by these beliefs (Smith, 
2005). 
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In addition, jurors have a tendency to embellish particular details if they 
receive inadequate information as a means of constructing a plausible sequence of 
events. Indeed, actual jury members after the conclusion of their trial revealed that 
jurors who felt the prosecution case was lacking in evidence were frustrated to not 
receive more evidence, even from the defence, to ‘fill in the gaps’ that the 
prosecution had failed to do in meeting their burden of proof (Hunter et al., 2010). 
However, the information that they choose to incorporate is likely to be consistent 
with this earlier (potentially biased) impression and subsequent assimilation and 
evaluation of specific evidence. Therefore, only the evidence relevant to the ‘story’ 
will be considered as opposed to the entire content of the trial proceedings. 
 
 
 
It is through this process of integrated representation (Hastie et al., 1983) or 
story  formation  (Pennington  &  Hastie,  1992)  that  the  influence  of  propensity 
evidence is fully realised. The integration of propensity evidence into the sequence 
of the story shapes how subsequent evidence is perceived by the juror, thus the 
influence  of  propensity  evidence  has  the  potential  to  persist  by  moulding  the 
direction of the story as the trial progresses (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979). 
Specifically, information presented after the disclosure of propensity evidence will 
be subject to the juror’s appraisal of propensity evidence. The more inferences that 
an individual makes as a result of the propensity evidence, the more difficult it will 
be to counteract that influence (Eichhorn, 1989). 
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Consequently, upon presentation of all evidence the juror finishes with a 
constructed representation of events that will then aid in determining their verdict. 
As is the norm today, a limiting instruction is then delivered in the judge’s final 
address to the jury in an attempt to contain the use of propensity evidence to a 
specified function. The extent that jurors can not only discount the evidence in their 
decision on the ultimate issue, yet also unravel the persisting influence that the 
propensity evidence has had on information, is questionable (Kassin & Wrightsman, 
1979; Pennington & Hastie, 1992). 
 
 
 
 
An example of this process is revealed in the previously reviewed study by 
Kassin and Wrightsman (1979), who found that although jurors were capable of 
discounting the evidence, and in fact later indicated that it was not influential in 
determining their verdict, jurors in the admissible and inadmissible (due-process) 
experimental groups evaluated subsequent information as more incriminating in 
comparison to jurors in the baseline control and inadmissible (low credibility) 
experimental groups. Similar results were also produced nearly two decades later in a 
study by Kassin and Sommers (1997). These findings highlight the perhaps 
unconscious manner in which propensity evidence influences the evaluation of later 
evidence and the importance in containing this influence as soon as practicably 
possible (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Hence, the introduction of an instruction at 
the conclusion of the trial process appears illogical as all pieces of evidence have 
been assimilated and evaluated in conjunction with one another. 
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The literature on intentional forgetting supports this view by recommending 
that an early attempt to intercept or correct the influence that may unjustly develop 
from  propensity  evidence  is  ideal,  as  opposed  to  endeavours  associated  with 
removing  the  information  once  it  has  been  encoded  and  assimilated  into  an 
integrated representation of the trial at hand (Johnson, 1994; Steblay et al., 2006). 
 
 
 
The last point to consider concerns methodological or measurement issues in 
assessing the effectiveness of a judicial instruction. Research studies show little 
evidence of explicitly enquiring as to whether the juror understood the content of the 
instruction and instead infers from results that this is indicative of a juror’s lack of 
comprehension. Consideration needs to be afforded toward the juror’s understanding 
of the instruction yet their possible defiance in following it (e.g. juror justice). 
Moreover, an alternative explanation is that the juror understood the instruction, 
however, found it near impossible to implement what is required under current 
judicial conditions (Tanford, 1990). 
 
 
 
Additionally, how researchers operationalise the ‘effectiveness’ of judge’s 
instructions will have implications as to whether an instruction proves to be effective 
or not. In conceptualising the effectiveness of judge’s instructions in a dichotomous 
manner, there is little scope to consider optional indicators of effectiveness. For 
example, rather than focus exclusively on the yes or no ability of the juror to forget 
or limit the use of the evidence, another means of verifying effectiveness may be to 
assess the weight that is assigned to other evidence adduced in the trial. It may be 
72 
 
 
that the juror’s inability to follow such an instruction is indisputable; however, a low 
percentage rating in relation to how they assess this evidence for credibility and 
contribution toward the verdict is indicative of the instruction working if little regard 
has being afforded to the evidence (Bjork, 1998). 
 
5.4       Summary 
 
 
 
 
In summary, there exists uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of a 
judicial instruction and the juror’s ability to comply with the request of the judge. 
This request involves the juror attempting to inhibit the application of propensity 
evidence for purposes in which its use is prohibited by the judge’s limiting 
instruction. This attempt requires an active effort to edit information and deny the 
opportunity for propensity evidence to act persuasively in other decision-making 
processes, such as in determining the ultimate issue (Bjork, 1998; Johnson, 1998). A 
number of factors contributing to the difficulty in complying with a judge’s 
instruction have been identified; thus, how effective an instruction is appears 
dependent upon a number of mechanisms. These mechanisms involve the temporal 
positioning of such an instruction, the juror’s comprehension of what is required, and 
the juror’s motivation and their ability to ignore the highlighted material in addition 
to undoing the influence that this material has had on subsequent information 
presented to them in the courtroom. Given that the trial by jury process rests on the 
notion that jurors follow judge’s directions and are competent in their ability to carry 
out their tasks, this is a vital research area (Charrow & Charrow, 1979). Given the 
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high risk of potentially unfair prejudice to the defendant, the need to understand the 
juror’s utilisation of propensity evidence and to deliver appropriate and effective 
limiting instructions is paramount. 
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CHAPTER SIX. CONTEXT FOR CURRENT THESIS 
 
 
 
The proposed study is a by-product of the research conducted by the 
University of New South Wales (UNSW) in 2006. This project, under the working 
title of the Pilot Jury Study (PJS; Hunter et al., 2010), involved investigating 
jurors’ responses regarding the issues of jury sleuthing (a topic not examined in this 
thesis) and the effectiveness of judge’s limiting directions regarding evidence of the 
defendant’s criminal history. Responses were obtained via a questionnaire that was 
developed for the specific purpose of this pilot study. 
 
 
 
Many of the findings from this study have been discussed throughout the 
preceding chapters where relevant. At the conclusion of their report, Hunter et al. 
(2010) recommended a follow- up study to thoroughly address and investigate 
methods which may aid in increasing juror comprehension and obedience to judicial 
instruction.  The research reported in this thesis was designed to mirror the design of 
the UNSW-PJS as closely as possible. 
 
6.1 Research aims and hypotheses 
 
 
 
 
Following recommendations made by Hunter et al. (2010), the general 
research aim was to investigate whether the admission of propensity evidence would 
significantly influence the verdict delivered in relation to a murder charge. If 
propensity evidence produced a significant effect toward verdict outcome, a 
secondary aim was to examine whether a limiting instruction can contain the  
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influence of propensity evidence and whether an optimal time exists for the limiting 
instruction to be delivered to the jury. A concurrent aim was to also explore whether 
propensity evidence assisted in adding context to the case, as contextual background 
is posited as a rationale for such evidence to be adduced in the courtroom. 
 
 
 
It was hypothesised that the presentation of propensity evidence would 
significantly influence the verdict returned by the participant. Specifically, a 
significantly higher number of guilty verdicts would be delivered by participants 
who received the admission of propensity evidence. In addition, although it was 
hypothesised that age would significantly relate to verdict outcome, it was unclear in 
which direction this relationship would occur. It was also hypothesised that gender 
would significantly influence verdict outcome; however, again the exact relationship 
was uncertain. Next, it was hypothesised that an instruction from the judge regarding 
the use of propensity evidence would be most effective in controlling for its 
appropriate use when the limiting instruction was delivered immediately following 
the admission of such evidence.  Lastly, it was hypothesised that participants 
receiving the admission of propensity evidence would indicate less desire to obtain 
additional information regarding aspects of the prosecution’s case, and therefore 
would not perceive there to be any evidentiary gaps, in comparison to participants 
who did not receive propensity evidence. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN. METHOD 
 
The present study was designed primarily to examine whether the admission 
of propensity evidence would affect participants’ verdicts within the context of a 
murder trial. If the admission of propensity evidence does affect participants’ 
verdicts, then a secondary aim was to explore whether an instruction from the judge 
can limit the influence of propensity evidence and whether there exists an optimal 
time for the instruction to be provided. Concomitantly, participants’ age, gender, 
method of completion, and perceptions regarding the utility of propensity evidence 
in assisting the participant to understand the facts of the case were also investigated. 
 
7.1 Design 
 
 
 
 
The design of the current study was a 4 x 2 x 6 x 2 between participants 
design. The first factor was propensity evidence and instructions: no propensity 
evidence; propensity evidence; propensity evidence with limiting instructions 
immediately following propensity evidence; and propensity evidence with the 
limiting instructions provided during the judge’s final address to the jury. To view 
the limiting instructions refer to Appendix A and B. The second factor was gender 
(female and male) and the third factor was age: 18-24 years; 25-34 years; 35-44 
years;  45-54  years;  55-64  years;  and 65  years and  over. The fourth factor was 
method of completion: hard-copy and online format. The dependent variables were 
frequency of guilty and not guilty verdicts, participants’ rating of the statement “I am 
77 
 
 
confident in the verdict I provided” on   a 5 point Likert scale ranging from ‘very 
strongly agree’ to ‘very strongly disagree’, factors identified by participants as 
influential  in their verdict, and perceived evidentiary gaps in the prosecution case. 
Note  that  in  Chapter  8.3,  the  dependent  variable  of  verdict  also  acts  as  an 
independent variable to participants’ agreement of confidence in their verdict. 
 
 
 
 
7.2       Materials and procedure 
 
 
 
 
The stimulus materials in the current study consisted of a Plain Language 
Statement and an amended court transcript of a murder trial and accompanying 
questionnaire which were part of the UNSW-PJS conducted by Hunter et al. 
(2010). 
 
 
 
The court transcript detailed a trial of a male defendant accused of murdering 
his female de facto partner. The original transcript was amended to reflect the 
research conditions involved in the study. Each court transcript contained the 
indictment, defendant’s plea, the prosecution and defence testimonies (i.e. opening 
statements, examination and cross-examination of several witnesses, and closing 
statements) and the trial judge’s summary which included instructions as to the 
standard of proof and criteria required in order to find the defendant either guilty or 
not guilty of the offence charged. Note that the evidence of some of the prosecution’s 
witnesses was substantially edited and details are therefore lacking in the direct 
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examination process. Depending on the research condition, the transcripts contained 
between 46 and 50 pages with an average word length of 20,784. 
 
 
 
The details of the alleged offence were identical in each of the four research 
conditions; the transcripts varied only in the admission of propensity evidence and 
the presence of a limiting instruction from the judge. The propensity evidence was 
contained in the testimony of the deceased’s mother, who was the second of four 
witnesses called in the prosecution case. The deceased mother’s testimony was 
received after the testimony of a neighbour of the couple and prior to the testimony 
of the police officer who responded to the 000 call and the medical practitioner who 
examined the deceased on two occasions; the previous incident that constitutes 
propensity evidence and following the alleged murder. Please refer to Appendix C to 
view the testimony containing the propensity evidence. 
 
 
 
Each questionnaire contained four sections: general views regarding criminal 
history; views regarding the participant’s experience in the mock trial; views 
regarding the evidence; and demographic information. Participants who received the 
judge’s instruction pertaining to the use of propensity evidence also completed a 
section enquiring into their views regarding the judge’s directions. The package 
materials took approximately one and a half to two hours to read and complete. 
 
 
 
Ethics approval for the current study was sought and granted by the Deakin 
 
University Human Research Ethics Committee. Potential participants were recruited 
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for the current study via the researcher’s social networks, by presenting the research 
study to book groups that convened across Melbourne, or through a snowballing 
technique. Participants were notified of the nature and purpose of the current study 
through the Plain Language Statement and that the research materials were available 
in a hard-copy format or online via the Deakin University website. Participants were 
advised that their involvement was voluntary and informed consent was indicated by 
the return of the package materials or the submission of data online. 
 
 
 
Each participant was randomly assigned to a research condition regardless of 
the method in which they participated. Participants were first asked, at their own 
convenience, to assume the role of a mock juror and read through the court transcript 
detailing a true-life criminal case. Participants in the control condition read a case 
that did not contain the admission of propensity evidence. Participants in the 
remaining three conditions read a transcript that consisted of the admission of 
propensity evidence; however the transcripts varied regarding judge’s instructions, 
with no instruction provided, an instruction provided immediately following the 
admission of propensity evidence, or an instruction provided in the judge’s closing 
summary to the jury. 
 
 
 
After reading the court transcript, participants subsequently completed the 
questionnaire that related to their transcript. The questionnaire required the 
participants to: 
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1. Provide their verdict by indicating whether the defendant was guilty 
or not guilty; 
2. Specify the confidence in the verdict provided by marking an option 
ranging from disagree to agree in relation to the statement “I am 
confident in the verdict I provided”; 
3. Detail the factors that influenced their verdict and list the factors that 
may influence other people provided with the same transcript by 
responding to open-ended questions such as ‘What are the factors that 
influenced your decision that the accused was guilty/not guilty of 
those offence(s)/charge(s)?’; 
4. Provide their views regarding the evidence adduced in the trial by 
answering questions such as “While reading the transcript were you 
interested in finding out more than the evidence presented in the trial 
process about the accused, the victim, other witnesses, other people 
not called as witnesses, and other aspects of the crime or where it 
occurred’ by marking the corresponding box; and 
5. Provide demographic information relating to, for example, gender, 
age, and occupation. 
 
 
 
In addition, participants who were randomly allocated to receive propensity 
evidence were required to: 
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1. Detail any criminal history provided by responding to the open-ended 
question ‘If you recall any evidence concerning the accused person’s 
criminal history that came out during the trial, briefly describe that 
evidence’; and 
2. Indicate whether the criminal history was related to their verdict by 
marking a checkbox. 
 
 
 
Participants who were allocated to the research condition with the limiting 
instruction from the judge were required to: 
 
 
 
1. Provide a recollection of the information contained in the judge’s 
instruction by answering the open-ended question ‘Can you tell us to 
the best of your recollection what was said’; 
2. Confirm when the instruction was provided by marking an option 
ranging from at the time when the evidence was first raised to after 
the judge gave his summary; 
3. Rate  the  clarity  of  the  instruction  from  unclear  –  I  could  not 
understand the directions at all to clear – I understood the directions 
precisely; and 
4. Detail what their understanding of the instruction was by responding 
to the open-ended question ‘What did you understand the judge to 
mean by these directions?’ 
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After completion of the questionnaire, participants were instructed to return 
the package materials to the researcher in the reply-paid, self-addressed envelope 
provided to them or to submit their responses online. Upon receipt of the hard-copy 
materials or online data, the demographic information and responses provided in the 
questionnaire were coded accordingly and entered into the Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 19 program to collate and analyse data. 
 
 
 
As the court transcripts were modified with the inclusion or exclusion of 
propensity evidence, a pilot study was conducted to evaluate the consistency and 
readability of each transcript. A pilot study was also considered necessary given that 
the research study rests on the premise that propensity evidence will in fact influence 
the juror’s decision making. In addition, as a limiting instruction was inserted into 
two  of  the  four  court  transcripts,  the  pilot  study  was  used  to  assess  the 
comprehension of the instruction from the judge. This is essential as it is redundant 
to expect jurors to follow an instruction when they cannot comprehend what the 
instruction entails (Thompson & Fuqua, 1998). 
 
 
 
Twenty participants were involved in the pilot study; thirteen of which 
completed the research materials in a hard-copy format and seven of which 
participated online. In general, verdict outcome was evenly distributed, with nine 
participants considering the defendant guilty and eleven participants delivering a 
verdict of not guilty. Of the 15 participants who received the propensity evidence, six 
indicated that the criminal history was related to their verdict. Of the nine 
83 
 
 
participants who received the judge’s limiting instruction, six participants rated it as 
 
‘clear’ or ‘very clear’. Three participants indicated that the instruction was ‘neither 
clear  nor  unclear’;  however,  their  qualitative  responses  suggested  that  they 
understood the instruction, with interpretations such as “only use the current 
evidence” and “that the evidence given was to be taken more to the credibility of the 
accused and not to the actual events that took place”. General feedback regarding the 
overall participation process revealed that most participants described the experience 
as “interesting”. 
 
 
 
 
7.3       Participants 
 
 
 
 
Although 126 questionnaires were initially returned, two participants who 
completed less than half of the questionnaire were subsequently removed from the 
data set. As previously mentioned, participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four research conditions that varied on the admission of propensity evidence and the 
presentation of a limiting instruction by the judge. For three of the participants, the 
research condition could not be determined as the amended court transcript was not 
returned  by  the  participant  in  the  reply-paid,  self-addressed  envelope  which 
identified the propensity-instruction condition. Hence, the number of participants in 
the four propensity-instruction conditions could only be identified for 121 of the 
participants. The breakdown is as follows: 
84 
 
 
1. No admission of propensity evidence (N = 26 and 6 for hard-copy and 
online completion respectively equalling 32 in total); 
2. Admission of propensity evidence with no instruction by the judge (N 
 
=  22  and  6  for  hard-copy  and  online  completion  respectively 
equalling a total of 28); 
3. Admission of propensity evidence with an immediate instruction by 
the judge (N = 26 and 8 for hard-copy and online completion 
respectively equalling 34 in total); 
4. Admission of propensity evidence with an instruction by the judge in 
the closing summary (N = 21 and 6 for hard-copy and online 
completion respectively equalling a total of 27). 
 
 
 
The final research sample therefore consisted of the 121 participants whose 
research condition could be identified by the researcher. Note that not all of the 121 
remaining participants completed every question in the questionnaire; therefore, the 
recorded N may not consistently total 121. Of the 121 participants, 33 were male and 
86 were female (two participants did not record their gender). Table 1 presents the 
number of participants in each age-gender condition. Note that there are two missing 
values for both of the demographic variables. 
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Table 1. 
 
The number of participants in each age-gender-propensity condition (N=119). 
 
 
 
 
Propensity Condition 
 
 
 
Control 
Group 
Evidence 
with no 
Instruction 
Evidence with 
Immediate 
Instruction 
Evidence with 
End 
Instruction 
 
Age 
18-24 years 3 5 5 4 
25-34 years 8 6 7 7 
35-44 years 3 1 4 2 
45-54 years 3 3 3 2 
55-64 years 7 7 5 2 
65 years plus 8 5 10 9 
 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
 
 
7 6 9 11 
25 21 25 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.4 Analyses 
 
 
 
 
As previously mentioned, upon receipt of the hard-copy materials and online 
data, participants’ responses were coded and entered into the Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 19 program. This enabled the researcher to 
generate the statistical analyses required to test each research hypothesis. 
 
 
 
A series of 4 x 2 chi-square tests were performed to analyse the non- 
parametric data. Although the degree or strength of the association is not reported in 
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a chi-square, a measure of association can be obtained. In the current study, the Phi 
coefficient  and  Goodman  and  Kruskal’s  tau  (-were  utilised  as  a  directional 
measure of association for nominal and ordinal variables respectively. 
 
 
 
As it is recommended that no greater than one fifth (20%) of cells contain a 
count less than five (Boslaugh & Watters, 2008; Connolly, 2007; Krysik & Finn, 
2010; Mitchell, 1971), the chi-square test is also sensitive to small expected 
frequencies in the cells of the table. Fisher’s Exact Test was employed in instances 
where the expected cell count was violated and the table was a 2 x 2 design. Fisher’s 
Exact Test has no assumptions and can be used regardless of the expected cell count; 
however, please note that it has no formal test statistic and provides only a p-value. 
The p-value for all statistical analyses was set at .05. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT. RESULTS 
 
 
8.1 Data preparation 
 
 
 
 
Data were initially screened for responses that were outside the expected 
values and no abnormalities were found in the data set. Although 121 participants 
were included in the final sample, not all 121 completed every question in the 
questionnaire. The N will also vary as a result of the control group (i.e. the group that 
were not presented with the propensity evidence) being excluded from particular data 
analyses that were targeted toward the influence of receiving such evidence. Thus, 
the N recorded in subsequent data analyses does not consistently total 121. 
 
 
 
The analyses of participants’ responses follow the same order in which they 
were obtained from participants and the order in which the dependent variables were 
presented in Chapter Seven. Thus, the impact of the independent variables on verdict 
will be examined first, followed by investigating the participants’ confidence, and 
exploring the factors that influenced participants’ verdicts. The current chapter 
concludes with an analysis of the participants’ perceptions regarding the adequacy of 
the prosecution’s evidence. 
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8.2 Verdict 
 
 
 
 
Participants in the current study were required to submit a verdict of guilty or 
not guilty in relation to the defendant’s charges. Of the 121 participants involved in 
the current study, a total of 14 participants (12%) considered the defendant not guilty 
while 107 participants (88%) returned a verdict of guilty. 
 
 
 
The frequencies of guilty and not guilty verdicts for the four propensity 
conditions are contained in Table 2. 
 
 
 
Table 2. 
 
The frequencies of guilty and not guilty verdicts for the four propensity conditions 
 
(N=121). 
 
 
 
 
Propensity condition Guilty Not guilty 
 
 
Did not receive propensity evidence 
 
 
26 
 
 
6 
Received propensity evidence and no instruction from the judge 26 2 
Received propensity evidence and immediate instruction from the 
judge 
30 4 
Received propensity evidence and instruction in the judge’s final 
address 
25 2 
 
 
 
 
Because 50% of cells reported an expected count less than five, the three 
groups who received the propensity evidence were collapsed into one grouping. No 
differences were found in the number of guilty and not guilty verdicts between 
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participants who did not receive propensity evidence and participants who received 
propensity evidence, (p = 0.20, Fishers Exact Test, two-sided). 
 
 
 
Gender was next examined to determine whether a significant relationship 
existed with the dependent variable of verdict. Note that as previously mentioned in 
Chapter 7.3, two participants did not record their gender. The frequencies of guilty 
and not guilty verdicts for females and males are contained in Table 3. 
 
 
 
Table 3. 
 
The frequencies of guilty and not guilty verdicts for female and male participants 
 
(N=119). 
 
 
 
 
Gender Guilty Not guilty 
 
Female 
 
78 
 
8 
Male 27 6 
 
 
 
 
Although there appeared to be a higher percentage of guilty verdicts given by 
female participants (90%) than male participants (82%), that difference was not 
significant (p = 0.21, Fishers Exact Test, two-sided). 
 
 
 
The relationship between age and verdict was next investigated. Note that as 
previously mentioned in Chapter 7.3, two participants did not indicate their age. 
Table 4 contains the frequency distribution of the verdict returned in each age 
category. 
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Table 4. 
 
The frequencies of guilty and not guilty verdicts as a function of participants’ age 
 
(N=119). 
 
 
 
 
Age Guilty Not guilty 
 
 
18-24 years 
 
 
17 
 
 
0 
25-34 years 27 1 
35-44 years 9 1 
45-54 years 9 2 
55-64 years 19 2 
65 plus years 24 8 
 
 
 
 
Given 50% of cells contained less than the expected count, the six age 
groupings were collapsed into three age groupings; 18-34 years, 35-54 years and 55 
plus years. Table 5 contains the revised frequencies of guilty and not guilty verdicts 
for the three age groupings. 
 
Table 5. 
 
The  frequencies  of  guilty  and  not  guilty  decisions  for  the  three  age  groupings 
 
(N=119). 
 
 
 
 
Age Guilty Not guilty 
 
 
18-34 years 
 
 
44 
 
 
1 
35-54 years 18 3 
55 plus years 43 10 
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Overall, participants in each age grouping delivered more guilty verdicts than 
not guilty verdicts. There was an age difference in the number of guilty and not 
guilty verdicts, χ2 (2, N=119) = 6.65, p = 0.04. Almost 19% of participants in the 55 
plus years category considered the defendant not guilty compared to 2% of 
participants aged between 18-34 years and 14% of participants aged between 35-54 
years. Note that although one cell reported an expected count below the minimum, it 
constituted only 16.7% of overall cells. 
 
 
 
No significant difference was observed between participants’ age and verdict 
for participants between the ages of 18-34 and 35-54 years, (p = 0.09, Fishers Exact 
Test,  two-sided)  and  for  participants  between  the  ages  of  35-54  years  and 
participants aged 55 years or older, (p = 0.75, Fishers Exact Test, two-sided). The 
significant difference was shown to exist between participants aged 18-34 years and 
participants 55 years or older, χ2 (1, N=98) = 6.77, p = 0.01). 
 
 
 
 
Goodman and Kruskal’s tau (- value of .06 indicates that knowledge of a 
participant’s age would reduce the error inherent in predicting participants’ verdict 
by only 6%. In other words, there is a 6% improvement in accuracy in predicting 
verdict when the age of the individual is taken into consideration. 
 
 
 
The frequencies of verdict for the age and gender interaction are shown in 
 
Table 6. 
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Table 6. 
 
The  frequencies  of  guilty  and  not  guilty  verdict  for  the  age-gender  conditions 
 
(N=119). 
 
 
 
 
Gender Age Verdict 
 
Guilty Not guilty 
 
 
 
Female 18-34 years 31 1 
35-54 years 15 1 
55+ 32 6 
 
Male 18-34 years 13 0 
35-54 years 3 2 
55+ 11 4 
 
 
 
 
A series of chi-squares was conducted to identify an interaction between age, 
gender, and verdict outcome. There was no significant difference in verdict outcome 
between females and males aged 18 to 34 years, (p = 1.00, Fishers Exact Test, two- 
sided), 35 to 54 years, (p = .13, Fishers Exact Test, two-sided), and 55 years or older, 
p = 0.44, Fishers Exact Test, two-sided). 
 
 
 
Finally, the method in which participants completed the study materials was 
also examined. The frequencies of guilty and not guilty verdicts for the two 
completion methods are displayed in Table 7. 
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Table 7. 
 
The frequencies of guilty and not guilty verdicts for the two completion methods 
 
(N=121). 
 
 
 
 
Completion method Guilty Not guilty 
 
 
Hard-copy completion 
 
 
81 
 
 
14 
Online completion 26 0 
 
 
 
 
A significant association was found between verdict and method of 
completion. Participants in the online condition were more likely to render a guilty 
verdict (100%) than participants who completed their task with a hard-copy of the 
materials (85%) (p = 0.04, Fishers Exact Test, two-sided). However, a Phi coefficient 
value of -.19 shows little to no negative association between the verdict of a 
participant and their completion method. 
 
 
 
In summary, neither participants’ gender nor knowledge of propensity 
evidence was found to be related to verdict outcome. However, participants’ age and 
the method in which the research materials were completed were found to influence 
verdicts. 
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8.3 Verdict confidence 
 
 
 
 
Participants in the current study were required to agree or disagree to the 
statement “I am confident in the verdict I provided”. In this instance, the dependent 
variable of verdict was also examined as an independent variable. The number of 
participants who agree and disagree with the statement “I am confident in the verdict 
I provided” for guilty and not guilty verdicts is contained in Table 8. Note that four 
participants did not indicate their confidence in the verdict outcome they determined. 
 
 
 
Table 8. 
 
The number of participants who agreed and disagreed with the statement” I am 
 
confident in the verdict I provided” for guilty and not guilty verdicts (N=117). 
 
 
 
 
Statement choice Guilty Not guilty 
 
Agree 
 
93 
 
10 
Disagree 12 2 
 
 
 
 
No relationship was found between participants’ verdicts and their agreement 
with the statement “I am confident in the verdict I provided” (p = 0.64, Fisher’s 
Exact Test, two-sided). 
 
 
 
The frequencies of agreement and disagreement for the four propensity 
conditions are displayed in Table 9. Four participants did not indicate their 
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confidence in the verdict outcome they determined and this is again reflected in the 
 
N value. 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. 
The frequencies of agreement and disagreement with the statement “I feel confident 
in the verdict I provided” for the four propensity conditions (N=117). 
 
 
 
 
Propensity condition Agree Disagree 
 
Did not receive propensity evidence 
 
26 
 
5 
Received propensity evidence and no instruction from the judge 25 2 
Received propensity evidence and immediate instruction from 
the judge 
30 3 
Received propensity evidence and instruction in the judge’s final 
address 
24 2 
 
 
 
 
Due to violations in expected cell counts in the data presented in Table 9, the 
propensity conditions were collapsed to contain the group of participants who did not 
receive propensity evidence as one grouping and participants in the three conditions 
who received propensity evidence as a second grouping. Collapsing the propensity 
conditions did not remedy the chi-square assumption violation. Retaining the 
collapsed propensity conditions, propensity evidence did not influence the number of 
participants who agreed with the statement “I am confident in the verdict I provided” 
(p = 0.30, Fisher’s Exact Test, two-sided). 
 
 
 
The impact of gender on the number of participants who agreed with the 
 
statement “I am confident in the verdict I provided” was next examined. The number 
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of females and males who agreed with the statement “I am confident in the verdict I 
provided” is contained in Table 10. Note that the N value reflects the two participants 
who did not report their gender and the four participants who did not report the 
confidence in their verdict. 
 
 
 
Table 10. 
 
The number of females and males who agreed and disagreed with the statement “I 
 
am confident in the verdict I provided” (N= 115). 
 
 
 
 
Gender Agree Disagree 
 
 
 
Female 
 
 
71 
 
 
11 
Male 32 1 
 
 
 
No difference were found in agreement with the statement “I am confident in 
the verdict I provided” between females and males, (p = 0.18, Fishers Exact Test, 
two-sided). 
 
 
 
The association between age and agreement with the statement “I am 
confident in the verdict I provided” could not be determined, due to expected cell 
counts below the required minimum. Implementing the collapsed age groups did not 
remedy the violation. The frequency distribution for the agreement in verdict 
confidence as recorded by the collapsed age categories is displayed in Table 11. Note  
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that the N value reflects the two participants who did not indicate their age and the 
four participants who did not report the confidence in their verdict. 
 
Table 11. 
 
The  number  of  participants  who  stated  that  “I  am  confident  in  the  verdict  I 
 
provided” for the three age groups (N=115). 
 
 
 
 
Age Agree Disagree 
 
18-34 years 
 
38 
 
5 
35-54 years 19 2 
55+ years 46 5 
 
 
 
 
Visual inspection indicates little or no differences between the three age 
groups in their agreement with the statement “I am confident in the verdict I 
provided”. Due to the low expected value of the disagree responses, a chi square test 
was not performed. 
 
 
 
Finally, the method in which participants completed the research materials 
was explored in relation to agreement of the statement “I am confident in the verdict 
I provided”.   The number of participants who agreed that “I am confident in the 
verdict I provided” for the two methods of completion is shown in Table 12. Recall 
that four participants did not indicate their confidence in the verdict outcome. 
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Table 12. 
The number of participants who agreed with the statement “I am confident in the 
verdict I provided” as a function of the two methods of completion (N=117). 
 
 
 
 
Completion method Agree Disagree 
 
 
Hard-copy completion 
 
 
80 
 
 
11 
Online completion 25 1 
 
 
 
 
There was no difference in agreement with the statement “I am confident in 
the verdict I provided” between the two methods of completion (p = 0.30, Fisher’s 
Exact Test, two-sided). 
 
 
 
In summary, there was no relationship between verdict, propensity evidence, 
gender, age or method of completion and the number of participants who agreed with 
the statement “I am confident in the verdict I provided”. 
 
8.4 Factors influencing participants’ verdicts 
 
 
 
 
Participants were asked to specify the most important factor determining their 
decision whether the defendant was guilty or not guilty. This information was 
obtained from an open-ended question and responses were grouped into ten 
categories. Note that 13 responses were classified as ‘other’ due to their divergent 
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nature. Table 13 displays the frequency distribution of these influential factors as 
recorded by verdict. 
 
Table 13. 
The  number  of  participants  who  identified  particular  factors  influencing  their 
verdicts (N=121). 
 
 
 
 
Factor Guilty Not guilty 
 
 
Alleged act of strangulation 
 
 
19 
 
 
0 
Defendant’s admission/confession 22 0 
Doubt regarding cause of death 0 4 
Doubt regarding defendant’s intent 0 5 
Medical evidence 15 1 
Post-offence behaviour of the defendant 9 0 
Presence of intent in the defendant 13 0 
Propensity evidence 8 0 
Relationship between the defendant and the deceased 4 1 
Statements/address from legal personnel 7 1 
Other 10 2 
 
 
 
 
Inspection of the reasons given by participants for their verdict suggests that 
participants give weight to different pieces of evidence for guilty and not guilty 
decisions. For example, a greater number of participants who delivered a not guilty 
verdict were influenced by their doubt regarding the cause of death or the intent of 
the defendant. The two factors most often forming the basis for a guilty verdict were 
the defendant’s admission or confession and the perceived act of strangulation that 
was (allegedly) engaged in by the defendant. Due to the low number of not guilty 
verdicts, it was not considered appropriate to undertake any statistical analyses. 
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8.5   Perceived evidentiary gaps 
 
 
 
 
As a means of evaluating participants’ perceptions regarding the prosecution 
case, participants were required to indicate whether they desired additional 
information in five aspects of the trial: the defendant; the victim; other witnesses; 
other people not called as witnesses; and other aspects of the crime. 
 
 
 
Responses to these five aspects formed the dependent variable and were first 
examined in relation to the independent variable of participants’ research condition. 
The number of participants who expressed a desire for more information about the 
defendant is displayed in Table 14 for each of the four propensity conditions. Note 
that five participants did not answer the question. 
 
 
 
Table 14. 
 
The  number  of  participants  who  expressed  a  desire  for  additional  information 
regarding the defendant as recorded in each propensity condition (N=116). 
 
 
 
Propensity Condition No Yes 
 
 
Did not receive propensity evidence 
 
 
11 
 
 
21 
Received propensity evidence and no instruction from the judge 15 10 
Received propensity evidence and immediate instruction from the 
judge 
21 12 
Received propensity evidence and instruction in the judge’s final 
address 
20 6 
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As the data in Table 14 show, significantly more of the participants not 
receiving propensity evidence compared to participants in the other three propensity 
conditions expressed a desire for additional information about the defendant, χ2 (3, 
N=116) = 11.60, p = 0.01. Multiple chi-square tests comparing each propensity 
condition with another highlighted a significant result for each analysis involving the 
propensity condition that did not receive the evidence; χ2 (1, N=57) = 3.72, p = 0.05, 
χ2 (1, N=65) = 5.57, and p = 0.02, χ2 (1, N=58) = 10.44, p < 0.01, respectively for the 
 
three propensity conditions that received the evidence. 
 
 
 
 
A phi coefficient value of .25, .29 and .42 respectively for the previous chi- 
square analyses indicates little to weak positive associations between participants’ 
responses as to whether they desire additional information regarding the defendant 
and their propensity condition. 
 
 
 
The number of participants who expressed a desire to have additional 
information about the victim in each propensity condition is shown in Table 15. Note 
that eight participants did not answer the question. 
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Table 15. 
The number of participants who expressed a desire for additional information about 
the victim as recorded in each propensity condition (N=113). 
 
 
 
 
Propensity condition No Yes 
 
Did not receive propensity evidence 
 
13 
 
19 
Received propensity evidence and no instruction from the judge 16 9 
Received propensity evidence and immediate instruction from the 
judge 
21 11 
Received propensity evidence and instruction in the judge’s final 
address 
17 7 
 
 
 
 
The overall relationship between propensity condition and the desire for 
further information regarding the victim was at best of marginal significance, χ2 (3, 
N=113) = 6.71, p = 0.08. However, multiple chi-square analysis identified a 
significant difference in the number of participants between the propensity condition 
not receiving the propensity evidence, 40.6% no response, and both propensity 
conditions receiving propensity evidence and judicial instruction; χ2  (1, N=64) = 
4.02, p = 0.05 and χ2 (1, N=56) = 5.03, p = 0.03 for immediate instruction, 65.6% no 
 
responses,  and  instruction  in  the  judge’s  final  address,  70.8%  no  responses, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
A phi coefficient value of .25 and .30 respectively for the previous chi-square 
analyses indicates little to no association between participants’ responses as to 
whether they will desire additional information regarding the victim as a function of 
their propensity condition. Therefore, while a significant relationship is shown 
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statistically, the strength of the contribution that the propensity condition has on a 
 
participant’s desire for additional information is weak. 
 
 
 
 
There was also a relationship between the propensity condition and the desire 
to obtain more information about other witnesses, χ2 (3, N=109) = 9.95, p = 0.02. 
The numbers of participants who expressed this desire are displayed in Table 16. 
Note that 12 participants did not answer the question. 
 
 
 
Table 16. 
The number of participants who expressed a desire for additional information about 
other witnesses as recorded in each propensity condition (N=109). 
 
 
 
 
Propensity condition No Yes 
 
Did not receive propensity evidence 
 
18 
 
12 
Received propensity evidence and no instruction from the judge 13 12 
Received propensity evidence and immediate instruction from the 
judge 
24 8 
Received propensity evidence and instruction in the judge’s final 
address 
20 2 
 
 
 
 
The pattern obtained in Table 16 is different from that of Table 14 and Table 
 
15, with more participants in all four propensity conditions indicating that they do 
not desire additional information compared to the number of participants affirming 
their desire to have additional information. Multiple chi-square tests comparing each 
propensity condition with another showed a significant difference in the responses of 
those participants not receiving propensity evidence, 60% no responses, and the 
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responses of those participants receiving propensity evidence and an instruction from 
the judge in the final address, 90.9% no responses, χ2 (1, N=52) = 6.16, p = 0.01. A 
phi coefficient value of .34 indicates a weak association between participants’ desire 
for additional information regarding other witnesses and receiving propensity 
evidence and instruction at the conclusion of the trial. 
 
 
 
In  addition,  there  was  a  significant  difference  in  the  percentage  of  ‘no’ 
 
responses of participants receiving propensity evidence and no judicial instruction, 
 
52% no responses, and the percentage of “no” responses of participants receiving 
propensity evidence and an instruction in the judge’s final address, 90.9% no 
responses, χ2 (1, N=47) = 8.47, p < 0.01. A phi coefficient value of .43 indicates a 
weak association between the desire for additional information regarding other 
witnesses and the participant receiving propensity evidence and an instruction in the 
judge’s final summation. There was no significant difference between participants 
who did not receive propensity evidence, 32.7% no responses, when compared with 
participants who received propensity evidence and no judicial instruction, 23.6% no 
responses, χ2 (1, N=55) = 0.36, p < 0.55. 
 
 
 
There was no relationship between propensity condition and the desire to 
obtain further information about other people not called as witnesses, χ2 (3, N=108) = 
3.22, p = 0.36. Note that 13 participants did not answer the question. There was also 
no  relationship  between  propensity  condition  and  the  desire  to  obtain  further
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information about other aspects of the crime, χ2 (3, N=108) = 1.40, p = 0.71 and 
again, 13 participants did not answer the question. 
 
Gender was next examined in relation to perceived evidentiary gaps. There 
was no difference in the responses from male and female participants desiring 
additional information about the five specified aspects of the trial: the defendant, χ2 
(1, N=115) = 0.74, p = 0.39; the victim, χ2  (1, N=112) = 0.02, p = 0.89; other 
 
witnesses, χ2 (1, N=108) = 0.31, p = 0.58; other people not called as witnesses, χ2 (1, 
 
N=107) = 0.09, p = 0.77; and other aspects of the crime, χ2 (1, N=107) = 0.08, p = 
 
0.78.   The   responses   from   participants   regarding   their   desire   for   additional 
information are displayed by gender in Table 17. 
 
 
 
Table 17. 
 
The number of participants who expressed a desire for additional information on 
each of the five aspects of the trial as recorded by gender. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
No 
 
Male 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
Female 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Defendant 
 
 
21 
  
 
12 
 
 
45 
  
 
37 
Victim 18  12 48  34 
Other witnesses 18  10 56  24 
Other people not called as witnesses 21  6 60  20 
Other aspects of the crime 20  7 57  23 
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The relationship of age of the participant to expressing a desire for further 
information was next explored. Note that two of the five chi-square analyses revealed 
expected cell counts below the required minimum and age was again combined into 
three categories. Age was significantly related to the desire to obtain further 
information about the defendant, χ2 (2, N=115) = 6.95, p = 0.03. The number of 
participants who desired additional information is shown in Table 18 for each of the 
three age groupings. Recall that five participants did not answer the question 
regarding their desire for additional information about the defendant. 
 
 
 
Table 18. 
The number of participants expressing a desire for additional information regarding 
the defendant as recorded in each of the three age groupings (N=115). 
 
 
 
 
Age No Yes 
 
18-34 years 
 
31 
 
12 
35-54 years 12 9 
55 plus years 23 28 
 
 
 
 
Inspection of Table 18 demonstrates that participants aged 55 years or over 
were more inclined to desire additional information about the defendant than were 
the participants aged from 18 to 54 years (55% versus 27.9% and 42.9%), χ2 (2, 
N=115) = 6.95, p = 0.31. Goodman and Kruskal’s tau (- value of .06 indicates a 6% 
reduction in error in predicting whether participants desire additional information 
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regarding the defendant when predictions are made on the basis of the participant’s 
 
age. 
 
 
 
 
There were no further findings of significance regarding age and the desire to 
obtain additional information about the victim, χ2 (2, N=112) = 0.26, p = 0.88; other 
witnesses, χ2 (2, N=108) = 0.13, p = 0.94; other people not called as witnesses, χ2 (2, 
N=107) = 0.57, p = 0.75; and other aspects of the crime, χ2 (2, N=107) = 0.23, p = 
0.89. 
 
 
 
 
Finally, there was no relationship between the method of completion and the 
desire to obtain additional information about the five specified aspects of the trial: 
the defendant, χ2 (1, N=116) = 1.81, p = 0.18; the victim, χ2 (1, N=113) = 2.66, p = 
0.10; other witnesses, χ2  (1, N=109) = 0.84, p = 0.36; other people not called as 
 
witnesses, χ2  (1, N=108) = 0.84, p = 0.36; and other aspects of the crime, χ2  (1, 
 
N=108) = 0.07, p = 0.79. 
 
 
 
 
In summary, a significant relationship was found between propensity evidence 
and the desire for further information regarding the defendant. The participants’ 
research condition was also significantly associated with the desire for extra 
information about other witnesses. Lastly, age was significantly related to the desire 
to obtain further information about the defendant. 
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CHAPTER NINE. FINAL REMARKS. 
 
 
 
 
The primary aim of the current study was to examine whether the admission 
of propensity evidence would influence participants’ verdicts within the context of a 
murder trial. If the propensity evidence did affect participants’ verdict, a secondary 
aim was to explore whether an instruction from the judge to jurors would mitigate 
such an influence and whether there exists an optimal time for that instruction. In 
addition, participants’ age, gender, method of completion, and perceptions regarding 
the utility of propensity evidence in facilitating their understanding of the facts of the 
case were investigated. 
 
 
 
The main findings of the research reported in this thesis are: 
 
1.  The admission of propensity evidence did not increase the percentage 
number of guilty verdicts; 
2.   The percentage of guilty verdicts decreased as a function of age. Older 
participants rendered fewer guilty verdicts than younger participants; 
3.   Gender of the participant did not influence verdict outcome; and 
 
4.  A higher percentage of guilty verdicts were given by participants who 
completed the task online than by participants who were provided with a 
hard copy of the materials. 
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9.1 Finding 1: The admission of propensity evidence did not significantly 
increase the percentage of guilty verdicts. 
 
 
 
The salient finding of the current study is the very high number of guilty 
verdicts reported by participants. One consequence of the very high number of guilty 
verdicts across all conditions is that any effects of the experimental manipulations 
will be difficult to detect. Thus, the failure to find any effects of propensity evidence, 
judge’s instructions and timing of those instructions, and gender is not surprising. 
The fact that there was an age effect suggests that age is a powerful factor in 
determining verdict in the present study. 
 
 
 
The high number of guilty verdicts returned in the current study was 
unexpected as a pilot study conducted to ensure the readability of the transcript and 
test the effects of the experimental conditions had found approximately equal 
numbers of guilty and not guilty verdicts. Why there were ceiling effects in the final 
study and not in the pilot study is puzzling, as participants in the main study received 
the same instructions, read the same transcripts, and were provided with the same 
task requirement as the pilot study. 
 
 
 
Earlier studies which found propensity effects (e.g. Doob & Kirshenbaum, 
 
1972; Hans & Doob, 1976; Greene & Dodge, 1995; Lloyd-Bostock, 2000; Pettus, 
 
1990; Wissler & Saks, 1985) did not have ceiling effects. All of these researchers 
found  a  significantly  higher  number  of  guilty  verdicts  when  participants  were 
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provided  with  evidence  of  the  defendant’s  past  criminal  convictions.  When 
comparing the studies previously mentioned to the present research, however, a 
number  of  variations  are  evident  which  may  have  accentuated  the  effect  of 
propensity  evidence  in  these  earlier  studies  and  minimised  those  effects  in  the 
present study. 
 
 
 
Some studies (e.g. Doob & Kirshenbaum, 1972; Hans & Doob, 1976; Lloyd- 
Bostock, 2000; Wissler & Saks, 1985) have utilised a fictitious or hypothetical court 
case whereas the current study consisted of an actual court transcript. Therefore, 
researchers may have had more control over the manipulation of certain variables 
which produced significant results. It is also possible that given the propensity 
evidence consisted of one incident of alleged assault in the current study, participants 
did not view the evidence as indicative of the defendant’s tendency to engage in 
violent or criminal acts and a weak manipulation may have occurred as propensity 
evidence was not shown to significant influence verdict outcome. However, the 
strength of the manipulation regarding propensity evidence may be an irrelevant 
factor to consider, given that guilty verdicts were already at a ceiling level. 
 
 
 
Furthermore, rather than a relatively short one to two page case summary, 
such as those employed by Doob and Kirshenbaum (1972), Hans and Doob (1976), 
or Wissler and Saks (1985), the current study provided participants with a 
comprehensive and approximate 20,000 word transcript. Well-developed and 
extensive  information  or  case  description  is  likely  to  provide  an  abundance  of 
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information on which to base a verdict. Given the length of the trial transcript 
contained in the present study, it can be argued that participants were provided with a 
wealth of information on which to base his or her verdict and propensity evidence, 
enmeshed with other pieces of evidence was not a crucial factor for the participant 
(Diamond, 1997). This position is supported by the fact that, for those groups who 
received propensity evidence, propensity evidence was identified as an influential 
factor in coming to a verdict by only 8 out of 121 participants. 
 
 
 
Another potential reason for the apparent weak manipulation regarding 
propensity evidence is that in addition to the testimony of Jane’s mother, propensity 
evidence was contained in the medical report, as the same medical practitioner 
examined Jane after the incident that now constitutes propensity evidence and also 
shortly before her death. As research (e.g. Pennington & Hastie, 1992) supports the 
idea that each piece of evidence is assimilated into the minds of a juror in a story- 
type fashion, then it is possible that the medical evidence, the information about the 
previous incident, and the allegations of strangulation all combined in the minds of 
the participant to influence verdict outcome. 
 
 
 
Lastly, the ceiling effect observed in the current study may be a product of 
the presence of confession evidence, which has been established as being decisive in 
previous research (Kassin & Neumann, 1997; Kassin & Sukel, 1997) and in this 
research was found to be identified as the evidence most influential on verdict 
outcome. Medical evidence was also a piece of evidence that was highly relevant to 
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participants. These two factors assist in establishing the guilt of the defendant, as the 
evidence that was submitted by the medical examiner supported the alleged act of 
strangulation that the defendant was said to have inflicted on the victim. 
 
 
 
The non-significant results of the current study are, however, consistent with 
research by Thompson et al. (1981) who also found that knowledge of the defendant’s 
previous conviction did not increase the conviction rate among participants. In the 
Thompson et al. research, participants whose ages ranged from 17 to 69 years viewed 
a videotaped trial of a defendant facing a murder charge. Ceiling effects can be ruled 
out as an explanation for the failure to find a propensity effect in Thompson et al’s 
study.  Because of the ceiling effects obtained in the current study, the contradictory 
findings pertaining to the effect of propensity evidence on verdict outcome cannot be 
resolved. 
 
 
 
The juror’s confidence in verdict outcome was also examined in the current 
study. Previous research has posited that confidence varies significantly as a function 
of the type of verdict that is delivered by the juror. Specifically, jurors who return a 
verdict  of  guilty  report  more  confidence  than  jurors  who  determine  that  the 
defendant  is  not  guilty  (Greene  &  Dodge,  1995;  Kassin  &  Neumann,  1997). 
However, the results of the current study found no relationship between juror’s 
confidence in verdict outcome and presence or absence of propensity evidence. That 
there was no difference in verdict confidence is surprising given that the juror is 
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required  to  be certain  ‘beyond  reasonable  doubt’  of  the  defendant’s  culpability, 
 
whereas there is no such requirement for a verdict of not guilty. 
 
 
 
 
It is also possible that the measure of confidence was not sensitive enough to 
detect any significant differences. While responses were originally recorded on a 5- 
point Likert scale, responses were later collapsed into two categories, agree or 
disagree, for the purposes of statistical analysis because of small numbers in some of 
the cells. Thus, additional information about propensity evidence may have increased 
participants’ confidence about their verdict; however, this could not be determined in 
the current study because most of the verdicts delivered by jurors were guilty and 
103 of 117 participants agreed with the statement “I am confident in the verdict I 
provided” irrespective of that verdict. This distribution of responses precluded 
detecting a relationship between verdict outcome and verdict confidence. 
 
 
 
However, prior research has found no relationship between participants’ 
 
verdicts and their confidence in those verdicts (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979; Green 
 
& Dodge, 1995; Wissler & Saks, 1985). Kassin and Wrightsman examined the 
influence of the timing of a judicial instruction on participants who were either 
provided with the instruction prior to the presentation of evidence, after the 
presentation of evidence or not provided with an instruction at all. Participants’ 
judgements were also either obtained on one occasion (at the conclusion of the 
audiotape) or at several points throughout the course of the trial. The level of 
confidence did not vary across the experimental groups. 
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Greene and Dodge (1995) also reported a similar finding with results from 
their study demonstrating that the admission or exclusion of prior record evidence or 
judicial instruction had no effect on confidence levels. Wissler and Saks (1985) also 
reported that verdict certainty did not significantly differ by type of crime or research 
condition. The failure to find a significant result in the previous literature examples 
cannot be attributed to ceiling effects. Because of ceiling effects, the current study is 
therefore unable to shed any light as to the reasons why some research studies have 
found a relationship between verdict outcome and confidence and others have not. 
 
 
 
A secondary aim of the current study was to explore whether an instruction 
from the judge can mitigate the influence of propensity evidence on verdict outcome 
and whether there exists an optimal time for the instruction to be presented to the 
juror. Given that propensity evidence not did influence verdict outcome, there was 
no effect for judge’s instructions to mitigate. 
 
 
 
A subsidiary aim of this research was to explore whether the admission of 
propensity evidence assisted in providing context to the case, given that a rationale 
for adducing such evidence is that it contributes contextual background for the juror. 
Despite the absence of any significant differences between propensity conditions in 
verdict outcome and confidence, more participants in the no-propensity research 
condition expressed the need for additional information in comparison to the 
participants   in   other   research   conditions.   Specifically,   participants’   research 
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condition  was  associated  with  the  desire  for  further  information  regarding  the 
defendant, the victim, and other witnesses involved in the trial 
 
 
 
While the finding that the control group desired further information about the 
defendant may appear to support the rationale for admitting propensity evidence into 
the trial, that of providing a more complete picture of the defendant, this explanation 
is inconsistent with the explanation advanced earlier that there was no effect of 
propensity evidence, because sufficient other evidence had been provided by the 
prosecution to produce a guilty verdict in the control group. 
 
 
 
The fact that the control group was the only group who desired extra 
information about the victim and other witnesses can be interpreted in two ways. 
First, that those participants in the groups receiving propensity evidence are able to 
deduce details about the victim and other witnesses from the propensity evidence. 
The second interpretation of the control group desiring further information about the 
victim and other witnesses as well as desiring additional information about the 
defendant is that the desire for additional information about the defendant is the 
result of an unidentified artifact. This latter interpretation is supported by the finding 
that verdict outcome did not significantly differ between the control group and the 
experimental conditions; hence, it appears that the information was not crucial to the 
overall decision making and verdict outcome of participants in the control group. 
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9.2      Finding 2: The percentage of guilty verdicts decreased as a function of 
  age. 
 
 
 
The finding that the percentage of guilty verdicts decreased with age is an 
important one, given that it occurred despite the overall high percentage of guilty 
verdicts. This finding is comparable to the findings of Mills and Bohannon (1980), 
who found that older adults were less likely to convict a defendant charged with 
murder than were younger adults. Although previous research has found that younger 
jurors are more inclined to render a verdict of not guilty in rape cases (Sealy & 
Cornish, 1973; Mills & Bohannon, 1980), it may be that the explanation for the 
conflicting findings has to do with the type of crime that was described in the case 
study. 
 
 
 
For example, in Sealy and Cornish’s (1973) study where younger participants 
were less likely to convict, the participants were returning a verdict for either a theft 
or a rape charge. Mills and Bohannon (1980) also found a similar age pattern to 
Sealy  and  Cornish  (1973);  that  is,  that  younger  participants  were  less  likely  to 
convict when the charge was rape. Lastly, Feild and Barnett (1978) found that 
younger adults imposed a more lenient sentence than older adults on a defendant 
who was charged with rape. However, when the crime of murder was examined, 
Mills and Bohannon (1980) found younger adults more likely to render a conviction 
than older adults, the reversal of the pattern they found for rape. This particular 
finding is one that also emerged in the current study where the defendant was on trial 
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for  murder,  with  all  bar  one  of  the  participants  aged  between  18  to  34  years 
rendering a guilty verdict and 11 of the 15 (73.3%) participants who returned a 
verdict of not guilty being aged 55 years or over. 
 
 
 
While the explanation regarding the effect of different crimes on different 
ages has been proposed by Sealy and Cornish (1973), the authors failed to elaborate 
on the exact manner in which particular crimes would impact on particular ages. It is 
also unclear to the author of this thesis as to how crimes of murder, rape, or theft 
would differentially impact participants of varying ages and, moreover, reverse the 
pattern of guilty verdicts that is found (i.e. a higher number of guilty verdicts reported 
by young people in murder cases and a higher number of guilty verdicts reported by 
older people in rape cases). 
 
 
 
A significant relationship was also found between the age of participants and 
their need for more information, with participants aged 55 years or older being 
significantly more likely to desire additional information about the defendant in 
comparison to participants aged between 18 and 34 years (refer to Table 18). This is 
an interesting finding given that previous literature suggests older adults process less 
pieces of information than younger adults when involved in decision making (Peters 
et al., 2007; Phillips & Sternthal, 1977); however, the information that is involved in 
this processing is vital to the decision at hand. Thus, it is possible that older adults in 
the current study felt that there was insufficient detail to reach a verdict and they 
therefore requested additional information significantly more so than younger adults. 
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This explanation may also help to account for the significant relationship 
between age and verdict outcome, where a higher number of acquittals were returned 
by those in the 55 years or older age group, as this age group may have felt that they 
did not possess sufficient information to deliver a verdict. However, this explanation 
fails  to  account  for  the  absence  of  an  interaction  between  age  and  propensity 
evidence in the current study, which would result from a higher percentage of older 
participants who received propensity convicting the defendant compared to older 
participants who did not receive propensity evidence, and also fails to account for the 
findings regarding a reverse pattern in studies examining rape. 
 
9.3 Finding 3: Participants’ gender did not influence the percentage of guilty 
 
 verdicts. 
 
 
 
 
The finding that gender did not influence the percentage of guilty verdicts is 
not entirely surprising because of the ceiling effects. Gender effects were also not 
obtained in a study by Villemur and Hyde (1983) who utilised an audiotaped rape 
trial. In considering research studies that have examined other charges, research also 
shows little support for the influence that gender produces on verdict outcome 
(Bridgeman & Marlowe, 1979; Moran & Comfort, 1982; Wissler & Saks, 1985). In 
particular, the overall conviction rate reported by Moran and Comfort was 82%, 
which was only 8% short of the conviction rate of the overall county in which the 
trials took place in (which was estimated at 90%). These figures are similar to the 
conviction rate reported by the overall sample (88%) in the current study. However, 
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failure to find gender effects in Moran and Comfort’s study may also be due to the 
 
high conviction rates reported. 
 
 
 
 
An important distinction is made between the research of Costantini and King 
(1980-1981) and Costantini, Mallery, and Yapundich (1983), who found females are 
more likely to prejudge the defendant as guilty in comparison to males, when 
compared to the current study as the dependant measure in the former studies was 
participants’ prejudgement of the defendant, and not final verdict outcome, which 
was the dependant variable in the current study. Costantini et al. (1983) were also 
able to demonstrate a link between pre-trial information and gender; that is, the 
propensity for women to prejudge the defendant as guilty was a function of their 
level of knowledge regarding the case. As the transcript used in the current study was 
from the state of New South Wales, and participants were recruited in the state of 
Victoria, it is assumed that participants’ knowledge of this particular case was 
minimal and therefore no prejudgments based on knowledge of the case could be 
made. 
 
 
 
Mills and Bohannon (1980) found that although guilty verdicts remained at a 
high level for females across all age categories, guilty verdicts increased with the age 
of males. A similar pattern for females was found in the current study, with 96.8% of 
the female participants in the 18-34 years of age category, 93.7% of the 35-54 year- 
olds females, and 84.2% of the female participants in the 55 years and over age 
category returning a guilty verdict. However, the pattern of verdicts by male  
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participants differed from that found by Mills and Bohannon, and the pattern of 
female verdicts obtained in this study, with 100% of male participants in the 18-34 
years of age category finding the defendant guilty, 60% in the 35-54 years of age 
category, and 73.3% of the male participants in the 55 years and over age group 
returning a guilty verdict. 
 
 
 
Female participants, across all age groups, delivered more guilty verdicts 
than not guilty verdicts. While a similar pattern was found in male participants who 
were 18-34 years of age and the males who were aged over 55 years, male 
participants who were between the ages of 35 and 54 years reported a similar number 
of guilty and not guilty verdicts. However, it would be premature to draw any 
definitive conclusions about the responses of 35 to 54 year-old males due to the 
small sample size of males between these ages. 
 
 
 
The finding regarding gender and verdict outcome in males has been 
previously reported by Mills and Bohannon (1980) who also found two peaks for 
guilty verdicts in males between 26 and 35 years of age and between 50 and 64 years 
of age. While the age categories in the current study are set up in a somewhat 
different manner, these ages are captured in the two age categories reporting higher 
guilty than not guilty verdicts, although the second category only partially overlaps. 
This U-shaped relationship has also been reported by Sealy and Cornish (1973); 
however, both sets of researchers offered no explanation for this finding. Why 35 to 
54 year old males appear to be more ready to acquit or return a verdict is puzzling. 
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Lastly, a significant relationship was not found between the gender of 
participants and their need for more information regarding the following five aspects 
of the trial: the defendant; the victim; other witnesses; other people not called as 
witnesses; and other aspects of the crime. Thus, no difference in interest was shown 
between females and males in acquiring further information. 
 
9.4 Finding 4: The method of completion was related to verdict outcome. 
 
 
 
 
There was a significant finding between method of completion and verdict 
outcome, with individuals who were completing the research materials online more 
likely to record a guilty verdict than participants completing the materials via the 
paper-and-pencil method. Given that 92% of participants who completed the research 
materials online were younger than 44 years of age, and those younger adults 
were more likely to vote guilty in comparison to older adults, it is not surprising that 
there were a higher percentage of guilty verdicts rendered by online participants. 
 
9.5 Contributions and Implications of the Current Study 
 
 
 
 
Notwithstanding the ceiling effect, there were two significant results that 
were obtained in the current study: the percentage of guilty verdicts decreased as a 
function of age; and, a higher percentage of guilty verdicts were delivered by 
participants who completed the task online rather than via hard-copy. The finding in 
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relation to age and verdict outcome in a murder trial is consistent with research that 
is available in the field and supports the notion that demographic variables, such as 
age, can influence the verdict outcome for different types of crime. In considering 
the implications of the current study’s findings for the practice of jury selection, it 
appears that a jury panel composed of older adults may be preferred by the defence 
team when the charge is one of murder, arising in the context of domestic violence, 
against the defendant. 
 
 
 
Although ceiling effects may have masked any propensity effects, the present 
study does address a criticism noted in the meta-analysis by Steblay et al. (2006). 
These researchers comment that, in general, the majority of the studies that were 
reviewed in the meta-analysis did not seek to examine the independent impact of the 
evidence on the verdict outcome of participants. The primary aim of the current 
study  was  to  investigate  this  impact;  however,  ceiling  effects  precluded  any 
definitive  conclusions  being  made  about  the  relationship  between  propensity 
evidence and verdict outcome. 
 
 
 
In addition, one of the study’s strengths is its diversity in the ages represented 
in the sample, as opposed to past research samples which are commonly composed 
of university students. This narrow research sample is often identified as a limitation 
by researchers in the field (Fischer, 1997; Mills & Bohannon, 1980; Pettus, 1990; 
Rose & Ogloff, 2001; Steblay et al., 2006). Thus, the present study illuminated the 
possibility that participants of varying ages may process evidence and engage in 
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decision making regarding the ultimate issue differently whilst also highlighting a 
research area requiring future empirical investigation. 
 
 
 
Lastly,  in  contrast  to  several  studies  that  were  reviewed  throughout  the 
second chapter (Doob & Kirshenbaum, 1972; Hans & Doob, 1976; Lussier et al., 
1977; Pickel, 1995; Wissler & Saks, 1985), the current thesis utilised a transcript 
amended from an actual criminal trial conducted in 2006 in Sydney, Australia. Thus, 
the trial transcript provides a higher degree of ecological validity than studies which 
provide briefer details. The shortcoming to this approach, however, and one that is 
often cited by researchers (e.g. Fischer, 1997; Lloyd-Bostock, 2000; Tanford & Cox, 
1988; Thompson et al., 1981) is that the ability to generalise the research findings 
may be limited to the facts of the specific case. 
 
9.6       Limitations of the Current Study and Recommendations for Future 
 
 
Research 
 
 
 
 
While several strengths were identified in the previous section, there are a 
number of limitations in the current study that need to be highlighted. As previously 
mentioned, the major limitation in the current thesis was the ceiling effect that 
occurred and which potentially obscured any effects of propensity evidence and the 
judge’s instruction. In addition, although the number of participants in each 
propensity condition is comparable to prior research (Doob & Kirshenbaum, 1972; 
Greene & Dodge, 1995; Lloyd-Bostock, 2000; Wissler & Saks, 1985), the small 
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numbers in many of the cells of the various contingency tables, as evidenced by the 
frequent violations in expected cell counts when performing a chi-square analysis, 
precluded more complex statistical testing. 
 
 
 
Other limitations that are commonly acknowledged in the research field and 
which were present in the current thesis include the use of a simulated research 
environment for empirical work on mock jurors. In an attempt to counter these 
issues, a transcript rich in detail was provided to the participants and focus was on 
the individual’s evaluation and impact of propensity evidence and the comprehension 
and effect of a subsequent limiting instruction prior to the social process of 
deliberation (Pennington & Hastie, 1990). Although the ability to generalise the 
findings is limited, examining the pre-deliberation response of the participant  is  
important  as  it  allows  an  insight  into  the  initial  reactions  to  the evidence that 
are often altered during deliberation and the final verdict outcome (Diamond, 1997; 
Kerr, 1981; Leigh, 1984; Sandys & Dillehay, 1995; Hastie et al. (1983). 
 
The attempt to mirror the University of New South Wales – Jury Pilot Study 
precluded  changes  being  made  to  the  content  of  the  propensity  evidence  in  an 
attempt to potentially increase the number of not guilty verdicts. Although there were 
significant amendments made to the evidence provided by witnesses, this was not in 
relation to propensity evidence. In addition, whilst changes could have been made to 
other aspects of the trial, the focus of the current study was the effect of propensity 
evidence on verdict outcome. 
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Pettus (1990) has also argued for the examination of actual jury members in 
order to generate the ecological validity of research findings. This line of approach 
appears necessary, as the current study did not replicate findings that have been 
obtained in studies which have used an actual jury sample (e.g. Hunter et al., 2010; 
Pettus, 1990). Lastly, other opportunities for future empirical work have been 
highlighted where appropriate throughout the current chapter. 
 
9.7 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
In conclusion, the present study did not replicate the findings from previous 
literature regarding the prejudicial impact of propensity evidence on verdict outcome. 
While it may be the case that the concern from the legal and psychology arena 
regarding propensity evidence being utilised in a prejudicial manner may not be 
warranted, it is also likely that as a result of the comprehensive evidence adduced in 
the transcript, participants were convinced of the defendant’s guilt without the 
need for propensity evidence. Nevertheless, a number of potential explanations have 
been provided as to why this contradictory result was obtained and recommendations 
have been made for future research to further examine this issue. 
 
While it is understandable that future research may wish to focus on the 
variables that have been shown here to influence juror decision making (i.e. age and 
other demographic variables), these ‘estimator’ variables, which are psycho-legal 
variables that are not under the control of the court, are useful only when challenging  
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and selecting certain individuals for a jury pool (Wells, 1978). Thus, the focus of 
research should be on ‘system’ variables, or those that are manipulable and therefore 
controllable in the courtroom, as findings to do with system variables can actually be 
applied and implemented in the criminal justice system (Wells). Thus, future research 
to clarify the inconsistent findings regarding propensity evidence and verdict 
outcome remain relevant. 
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APPENDIX A: JUDGE’S IMMEDIATE INSTRUCTION 
 
Examination in chief of Mrs Smith concludes and at this point in time the judge 
intercepts in the proceedings. 
 
May I remind members of the jury of what I stated during my opening address to 
you, that is that during any stage of the trial, although predominantly at the end of 
the trial, it is my duty to sum-up to you and to give you directions as to the matters of 
law you are to apply in performing your very important task. Given the nature of the 
evidence just presented to you by Mrs Smith I find that it is imperative I provide to 
you at this point in time a clear direction as to the manner in which you, members of 
the jury, can use such evidence. 
 
As a general rule in criminal cases, bad behaviour or anything in the nature relating 
to an accused person is not admissible before a jury. If it does not get in under some 
other principle it is certainly not gratuitously admitted. If such evidence is to be 
received it must owe its admissibility to some, quite specific, other purpose, 
including for example, in an appropriate case, proof of a guilty passion, intention, or 
propensity, or opportunity, or motive. There may also be cases in which a 
relationship between people may be directly relevant to an issue in a trial and in 
those circumstances admissible as such. 
 
This evidence can only be used by you, the jury, if the jury was satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt that such conduct in fact occurred. Furthermore, even if you the 
jury accept the whole or part of the evidence of uncharged acts, that evidence does 
not of itself prove the offence/s with which the accused is charged. This offence/s 
can be proved only by the evidence which relates to this count/s. 
 
The evidence introduced and received here by you, if you choose to accept all or any 
part of it, is admissible for two limited purposes and can only be used for these two 
purposes. It is relevant to the question of the nature of the relationship between the 
accused and the deceased, and it places the evidence relating to the offence against 
the accused in a more complete and realistic context. In the long run you must be 
satisfied of the guilt of the accused of the actual charge or charges brought before 
you in order to convict him. You may not substitute evidence of some other incident 
not the subject of a charge for the evidence in support of the charged incident. It 
would be wrong, prejudicial and contrary to law for you to reason that because the 
accused had engaged in some improper conduct at some other time or times, he was 
the kind of person who was likely to have committed the crimes charged and to use 
such a conclusion as evidence that he committed them or any of them. That is 
improper reasoning and it is never allowed in our criminal legal system. 
 
Thank you. Defence, you may proceed with your cross-examination of Mrs Smith. 
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APPENDIX B: JUDGE’S END OF TRIAL INSTRUCTION 
 
In relation to the matter of inference, I must also caution you against a type of 
reasoning known as propensity reasoning. In this trial, you have heard evidence from 
Mrs Smith and Dr. Jones concerning a previous alleged assault conducted on the 
deceased by the accused in June of 2006. 
 
As a general rule in criminal cases, bad behaviour or anything in the nature relating 
to an accused person is not admissible before a jury. If it does not get in under some 
other principle it is certainly not gratuitously admitted. If such evidence is to be 
received it must owe its admissibility to some quite specific, other purpose, including 
for  example,  in  an  appropriate  case,  proof  of  a  guilty  passion,  intention,  or 
propensity,  or  opportunity,  or  motive.  There may also be cases in which a 
relationship between people may be directly relevant to an issue in a trial and in 
those circumstances admissible as such. 
 
This evidence can only be used by you, the jury, if the jury was satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt that such conduct in fact occurred. Furthermore, even if you the 
jury accept the whole or part of the evidence of uncharged acts, that evidence does 
not of itself prove the offence/s with which the accused is charged. This offence/s 
can be proved only by the evidence which relates to this count/s. 
 
The evidence introduced and received here by you, if you choose to accept all or any 
part of it, is admissible for two limited purposes and can only be used for these two 
purposes. It is relevant to the question of the nature of the relationship between the 
accused and the deceased, and it places the evidence relating to the offence against 
the accused in a more complete and realistic context. In the long run you must be 
satisfied of the guilt of the accused of the actual charge or charges brought before 
you may convict him. You may not substitute evidence of some other incident not 
the subject of a charge for the evidence in support of the charged incident. It would 
be wrong, prejudicial and contrary to law for you to reason that because the accused 
had engaged in some improper conduct at some other time or times, he was the kind 
of person who was likely to have committed the crimes charged and to use such a 
conclusion as evidence that he committed them or any of them. That is improper 
reasoning and it is never allowed in our criminal legal system. 
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APPENDIX C: TESTIMONY CONSTITUTING PROPENSITY EVIDENCE 
 
Q.  Whilst they were still living in the boarding house was there an occasion when 
Jane came to you? 
A.  There was.  There was, in June. 
 
Q.  The incident I am asking you to talk about when Jane came to your place, you 
said it was in June.  Which is the year of her death, 2006. 
A. She turned up at our place at 3 o'clock in the morning.  Her face was - all her eyes 
she couldn't - I couldn't recognise her.  I knew she was my daughter but I couldn't 
recognise her face was all swollen, she had blood on her slippers, she had finger 
marks on her arm, bruising on her back.   I mean I was in shock.   I brought her 
inside -- 
The swelling in her face. On one side of her face, her eye was nearly closed. She had 
blood on her jumper, she had spots on her - she had her sleeves rolled up so she had 
blood on her skin and she had blood on her slippers. 
 
Q.  Did she say what had led him to do those things? 
A.  She kept saying "John's accusing me of playing up and he just kept going on 
and on and on". 
 
Q.  When she woke up what did you and she do? 
A.  I had a good look at her and sat her down and I said to her - I didn't know if her 
nose was broken.  I said "You will have to go to the hospital.  I will have to take you 
to the hospital". 
 
Q.  And were the police contacted? 
A.  I rang Fraser Town Police.  I had a talk to her and I said - she said "that's it.  I've 
had enough, I'm leaving".  And I rang Fraser Town Police.  And I said "Okay, I will 
take you to the hospital then we will go to the police station, okay".  She said "We 
will". 
 
Q.  And so did you go to the hospital? 
A.  I took her to the hospital. 
 
Q.  And did she stay at your place that night? And did she continue to live at your 
place after she had come out of hospital? 
A.  She did for a little while, a few days, may be a week. 
 
Q.  And to your knowledge did she ever report the matter to the police? 
A.  I asked her if she had been to the police station and she said, no. 
 
Q.  Well, did she resume her contact with John after this incident in June 2006? A.  
She did. She went to stay at a girlfriend's house and then she rang me and said that 
"Mum, I'm back with John". 
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Q. Did you see her again? On how many occasions, can you say? 
A.  A few times, a couple of times. 
 
Q.  Did you notice anything about her on that occasion? 
A.  She still had the bruising.  Her eyes were orange.  She looked terrible. 
